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VICTIMS AS INSTRUMENTS
Rachel J. Wechsler*
Abstract: Crime victims are often instrumentalized within the criminal legal process in
furtherance of state prosecutorial interests. This is a particularly salient issue concerning
victims of gender-based violence (GBV) because victim testimony is typically considered
essential for successful prosecution of these types of crimes. Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s
2004 decision in Crawford v. Washington, courts require declarants to be available for crossexamination on “testimonial” hearsay evidence. Consequently, criminal legal actors are further
incentivized to employ highly coercive practices aimed at securing GBV victims’ participation
in the criminal legal process as evidentiary tools. These practices include arresting and
incarcerating victims through material witness warrants and contempt power, criminally
charging and threatening charges against them, and conditioning key assistance measures upon
their full cooperation with law enforcement. This Article critically examines paternalistic and
utilitarian justifications for these practices and exposes their misalignment with the core
principles of paternalism and utilitarianism. It then examines the state’s approach to GBV
victims under three interrelated conceptual frameworks which have thus far been overlooked
in this context: deontological ethics, dehumanization constructs, and liberal legal principles.
This novel critique argues that the practices at issue are incompatible with foundational
principles concerning the dignified treatment of individuals within the liberal legal order. It
also contends that the targeted use of these coercive mechanisms operates as punishment for
victims who fail to conform to “ideal” and legitimate GBV victim stereotypes, which require
full cooperation with criminal legal authorities. Following this analysis, the Article proposes a
normative shift in the approach, from one that conceptualizes GBV victims primarily as
instruments to one that constructs them as agents whose dignity and autonomy the state must
respect.
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INTRODUCTION
All Western languages as well as modern Hebrew and Arabic refer to
crime victims “with words denoting sacrifice and/or sacrificial objects.”1
For example, the English “victim,” the French “victime,” and the Italian
“vittima” all derive from the Latin “victima,” which means “sacrificial
object.”2 Victimologist Jan van Dijk links these etymological origins with
contemporary constructions of the “ideal” victim as one who is innocent,
passive, suffering, non-retaliatory, and forgiving.3 But there is an
additional linkage between the etymological roots and contemporary
status of victims:4 they are often treated as objects to be sacrificed in
1. Jan van Dijk, Free the Victim: A Critique of the Western Conception of Victimhood, 16 INT’L
REV. VICTIMOLOGY 1, 2 (2009) [hereinafter van Dijk, Free the Victim]; see also Jan van Dijk, In the
Shadow of Christ?: On the Use of the Word “Victim” for Those Affected by Crime, 27 CRIM. JUST.
ETHICS 13, 13–14 (2008) [hereinafter van Dijk, Shadow of Christ].
2. van Dijk, Shadow of Christ, supra note 1, at 13.
3. Id. at 15, 20–22; van Dijk, Free the Victim, supra note 1, at 8, 12–25. The concept of the “ideal”
crime victim was originally introduced by criminologist Nils Christie. Nils Christie, The Ideal Victim,
in FROM CRIME POLICY TO VICTIM POLICY: REORIENTING THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 17, 18–19 (Ezzat A.
Fattah ed., 1986).
4. The use of the term, “victim,” is complex and contested in scholarly and popular discourse. Some
feminists have argued that “survivor” should be used instead of “victim” on the grounds that the latter
stigmatizes women who have experienced violence as weak and passive, and the former highlights
their strength and resistance. This conceptualization propelled a shift from the use of “victim” to
“survivor” within the feminist discourse in the early 1980s. LIZ KELLY, SURVIVING SEXUAL
VIOLENCE 159–60 (1988). However, the use of “survivor” has also been criticized as minimizing the
trauma of sexual violence and depriving the individual who has experienced it of support and
sympathy when the need arises. E.g., Monica Thompson, Life After Rape: A Chance to Speak?, 15
SEXUAL & RELATIONSHIP THERAPY 325, 330 (2000). Both terms have rightly been criticized as
reductive and together representing a false dichotomy. See, e.g., Jericho M. Hockett, Lora K. McGraw
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furtherance of state5 prosecutorial interests.
The treatment of crime victims as proverbial “sacrificial objects”—
essentially mere instruments of the criminal legal system—has been
observed and criticized in the U.S. and in other jurisdictions across the
globe, especially with respect to victims of gender-based violence
(GBV).6 The prevalence of this phenomenon is an outgrowth of the
dominant crime-centered approach to GBV, which prioritizes carceral

& Donald A. Saucier, A “Rape Victim” by Any Other Name, in EXPRESSION OF INEQUALITY IN
INTERACTION: POWER, DOMINANCE, AND STATUS 81, 97–98 (Hanna Pishwa & Rainer Schulze eds.,
2014). In reality, many individuals who have experienced crime identify differently within different
contexts—utilizing one, both or neither of the terms in various settings and time periods in their lives.
See id. at 85. In this Article, the word “victim” is used to refer to an individual who has had a (genderbased violence) crime committed against her and does not employ the term to suggest a particular
identity, set of characteristics, or pattern of behavior for this individual (though I acknowledge the
difficulty of disentangling terms from certain cultural connotations). Moreover, I often use “victim”
instead of “survivor” to underscore the harm the state inflicts through its use of coercive and
instrumentalizing practices with this population, as the former term is more often associated with
harm and injury (both legally and colloquially). See Victim, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed.
2019) (defining “victim” as “[a] person harmed by a crime, tort, or other wrong”); Amy Leisenring,
Confronting “Victim” Discourses: The Identity Work of Battered Women, 29 SYMBOLIC
INTERACTION 307, 316 (2006) (finding that women who experienced intimate partner violence
“commonly defined a victim as a person who is in some way harmed” in a qualitative study). Yet, I
recognize that neither “victim” nor “survivor” is perfect.
5. I primarily employ the term “state” to refer to government in general rather than to one (or more)
of the fifty U.S. states.
6. See, e.g., Janie A. Chuang, Rescuing Trafficking from Ideological Capture: Prostitution Reform
and Anti-Trafficking Law and Policy, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1655, 1705 (2010) (U.S.); DANIELLE SERED,
UNTIL WE RECKON: VIOLENCE, MASS INCARCERATION, AND A ROAD TO REPAIR 189 (2019) (U.S.);
Luz María Puente Aba & Agustina Iglesias Skulj, The Spanish Plan Against Trafficking in Women:
Policies and Outcomes (2008–2011), in THE ILLEGAL BUSINESS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING 71, 81
(Maria João Guia ed., 2015) (Spain); Witold Klaus, Konrad Buczkowski & Paulina Wiktorska,
Empowering the Victims of Crime: A Real Goal of the Criminal Justice System or No More Than a
Pipe Dream?, in TRUST AND LEGITIMACY IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 65, 79
(Gorazd Meško & Justice Tankebe eds., 2015) (Poland); Marie Segrave, Surely Something Is Better
than Nothing? The Australian Response to the Trafficking of Women into Sexual Servitude in
Australia, 16 CURRENT ISSUES CRIM. JUST. 85, 88, 90 (2004) (Australia); Mary Cunneen, AntiSlavery International, 1 J. GLOB. ETHICS 85, 91 (2005) (multinational). “[G]ender-based violence” is
traditionally understood as “‘violence which is directed against a woman because she is a woman or
that affects women disproportionately.’” Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, Gen. Recommendation No. 35 on Gender-based Violence Against Women, Updating Gen.
Recommendation No. 19, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/35, at 2 (July 14, 2017). More recently, the term
has also been used to describe violence against individuals who do not identify or present as women,
perpetrated on the basis of their actual or perceived gender identity and/or sexual orientation. See
INT’L LAB. ORG., MEDIA-FRIENDLY GLOSSARY ON MIGRATION: WOMEN MIGRANT WORKERS AND
ENDING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (EVAW) EDITION 9 (2020). This Article does not exclude these
individuals, but I recognize that there are particular issues and potential differences related to the
experiences of gender minorities which merit exploration but fall outside of the scope of this
discussion.
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responses in addressing this social problem.7 This Article focuses on the
state’s “instrumentalization” of GBV victims within the criminal legal
process—referring to the construction and use of these individuals as
evidentiary tools in the state’s investigation and prosecution of GBV
offenders.
GBV victims are particularly vulnerable to state coercion and
instrumentalization because victim testimony is typically considered
essential for successful prosecution of GBV crimes, including human
trafficking, intimate partner violence (IPV), and sexual assault.8
Governments are further incentivized to instrumentalize this population
by overreliance upon numerical indicators, particularly those concerning
criminal legal system activities such as number of prosecutions and
convictions, in assessments of their responses to GBV (e.g., the U.S. State
Department’s annual Trafficking in Persons reports).9 The incentives to
do so are especially strong in the U.S. due to the Supreme Court’s
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. The seminal Crawford v.
Washington10 decision has made victims’ cooperation practically
indispensable in GBV prosecutions because it requires them to be
available for cross-examination if their testimonial out-of-court
statements, such as verbal statements during police interviews conducted
after a GBV incident and written statements in petitions for civil orders of
protection, are to be admitted into evidence.11 Crawford’s progeny
7. See Chuang, supra note 6, at 1663, 1694, 1704–05, 1725; Donna Coker, Crime Logic, Campus
Sexual Assault, and Restorative Justice, 49 TEX. TECH L. REV. 147, 149, 155 (2016); Donna Coker &
Ahjané D. Macquoid, Why Opposing Hyper-Incarceration Should Be Central to the Work of the AntiDomestic Violence Movement, 5 U. MIA. RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV. 585, 587 (2015); JENNIFER
MUSTO, CONTROL AND PROTECT: COLLABORATION, CARCERAL PROTECTION, AND DOMESTIC SEX
TRAFFICKING IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (2016).
8. See Amy Farrell, Colleen Owens & Jack McDevitt, New Laws but Few Cases: Understanding
the Challenges to the Investigation and Prosecution of Human Trafficking Cases, 61 CRIME, L. &
SOC. CHANGE 139, 157–58, 162 (2014); Tom Lininger, The Sound of Silence: Holding Batterers
Accountable for Silencing Their Victims, 87 TEX. L. REV. 857, 870–71 (2009).
9. See SALLY ENGLE MERRY, THE SEDUCTIONS OF QUANTIFICATION: MEASURING HUMAN
RIGHTS, GENDER VIOLENCE, AND SEX TRAFFICKING 134, 137 (2016); Kimberly D. Bailey, It’s
Complicated: Privacy and Domestic Violence, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1777, 1806–07 (2012).
10. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
11. See Lininger, supra note 8, at 864 (“The Supreme Court’s recent confrontation jurisprudence,
beginning with Crawford v. Washington in 2004, has exacerbated the plight of [domestic violence]
victims by making them indispensable as trial witnesses.”); Anoosha Rouhanian, A Call for Change:
The Detrimental Impacts of Crawford v. Washington on Domestic Violence and Rape Prosecutions,
37 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 1, 70 (2017) (“Crawford v. Washington and its progeny can be a significant
detriment to the prosecution of rape and domestic violence cases by keeping testimonial hearsay—
evidence that is often essential for a conviction—out of trial when victims of such cases are
unavailable for cross-examination.”); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Forfeiture After Giles: The Relevance
of “Domestic Violence Context”, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 711, 730 (2009) (“Because evidence-
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affirmed strict cross-examination requirements for many types of
evidence typically relied upon in GBV prosecutions, thereby incentivizing
the instrumentalization of victims as prosecutorial tools.12
Moreover, it is crucial to examine the coercive tactics used to
instrumentalize GBV victims in particular because the potential harms are
especially serious for this population, given their already high risk of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and other psychological sequelae.13 The
significant likelihood of harm combined with powerful incentives for
based prosecution has undoubtedly become more difficult in this post-Crawford era, it is fair to predict
that the Court’s rulings will compel prosecutors to secure victim testimony in a greater number of
cases.”).
12. See Crawford, 541 U.S. 36; Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (holding that
statements made in response to a police interrogation are classified as “testimonial,” and therefore
subject to the Confrontation Clause, if they are not made during an “ongoing emergency” and the
“primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later
criminal prosecution”); Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 371–77 (2011) (suggesting that a lack of
threat and injury during and the existence of formality and structure in a police interrogation weigh
in favor of classifying statements made during it as testimonial); Rouhanian, supra note 11, at 18–21
(criticizing Michigan v. Bryant on the grounds that the multi-factor analysis it introduces to determine
whether a statement made within the context of an emergency is “testimonial” leaves courts too much
discretion, which is likely to adversely affect domestic violence and rape prosecutions); see also Giles
v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 356–58 (2008) (accepting that verbal statements made to a police officer
responding to a domestic violence report counted as “testimonial,” a classification which the State
did not dispute). Although the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine allows for the admission of
testimonial hearsay when the witness is unavailable for cross-examination due to the defendant’s
actions, which were designed to prevent her from testifying, this of course does not apply in the
numerous other situations in which a victim resists involvement in the criminal legal process. See id.
at 359–69; Andrea J. Nichols, No-Drop Prosecution in Domestic Violence Cases: Survivor-Defined
and Social Change Approaches to Victim Advocacy, 29 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 2114, 2118–19
(2014) (describing many reasons why some domestic violence victims do not wish to assist with the
prosecution of their abuser, including a desire to avoid reliving their abuse and seeing their abuser in
court, financial concerns about missing work to attend proceedings or losing the defendant’s income,
and a fear of Child Protective Services intervention); Rachel J. Wechsler, Deliberating at a
Crossroads: Sex Trafficking Victims’ Decisions About Participating in the Criminal Justice Process,
43 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1033, 1049–55, 1070–71, 1073–74, 1078–80 (2020) (identifying fear of
reprisals, a belief that pressing charges would be futile, a link with one’s trafficker, and a desire to
move on from the past as factors weighing against proceeding with the criminal justice process for
sex trafficking victims).
13. See, e.g., Mazeda Hossain, Cathy Zimmerman, Melanie Abas, Miriam Light & Charlotte Watts,
The Relationship of Trauma to Mental Disorders Among Trafficked and Sexually Exploited Girls and
Women, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2442, 2444–45 (2010) (finding that 77% of a sample of 204 female
sex trafficking victims had high levels of PTSD symptoms, 48% experienced high levels of anxiety
symptoms, and 55% had high levels of depression symptoms, after statistically controlling for pretrafficking violence and abuse); Emily R. Dworkin, Risk for Mental Disorders Associated with Sexual
Assault: A Meta-Analysis, 21 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE 1011, 1018 (2020) (finding that
experiencing sexual assault is associated with an increased risk of many DSM-defined mental
disorders, especially PTSD and depressive disorders); Dominique E. Roe-Sepowitz, Kristine E.
Hickle, Jaime Dahlstedt & James Gallagher, Victim or Whore: The Similarities and Differences
Between Victim’s Experiences of Domestic Violence and Sex Trafficking, 24 J. HUM. BEHAV. SOC.
ENV’T 883, 890 (2014) (observing that both victims of domestic violence and sex trafficking
frequently experience traumatic events).
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instrumentalization likely contribute to the high incidence of secondary
victimization14 and re-traumatization among victims of GBV.15
Furthermore, these dynamics are significant because they are colored by
wider societal norms, both current and historical, which disempower GBV
victims and women more generally.16
This Article examines several tactics used to coerce GBV victims’
participation in the investigation and prosecution of offenders. These
tactics are emblematic of a wider approach in which GBV victims are
constructed as sacrificial, prosecutorial instruments: arresting and
incarcerating them through material witness and contempt warrants,17
threatening and bringing criminal charges against them,18 and
conditioning key assistance upon their full cooperation with criminal legal
authorities.19 The severity of these practices calls for in-depth analysis of
their implications, justifications, consequences, and moral status. This
Article provides this novel analysis and argues that both traditional
justifications for these practices based on paternalism and utilitarianism,

14. “Secondary victimization” is broadly defined as the inadequate, insensitive, unfair, or
inappropriate treatment of crime victims, typically on the part of criminal justice and social agencies,
which compounds the trauma from their primary victimization. See Anna Gekoski, Joanna R. Adler
& Jacqueline M. Gray, Interviewing Women Bereaved by Homicide: Reports of Secondary
Victimization by the Criminal Justice System, 19 INT’L REV. VICTIMOLOGY 307, 308 (2013); Jo-Anne
Wemmers, Victims’ Experiences in the Criminal Justice System and Their Recovery from Crime, 19
INT’L REV. VICTIMOLOGY 221, 221–22 (2013).
15. See Rebecca Campbell, What Really Happened? A Validation Study of Rape Survivors’ HelpSeeking Experiences with the Legal and Medical Systems, 20 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 55, 61–62 (2005)
(finding high rates of secondary victimization among rape survivors within the context of their
interaction with police officers following their primary victimization); Rebecca Campbell & Sheela
Raja, The Sexual Assault and Secondary Victimization of Female Veterans: Help-Seeking Experiences
with Military and Civilian Social Systems, 29 PSYCH. WOMEN Q. 97, 102 (2005) (finding that 65% of
female veterans in their study reporting their sexual assaults experienced secondary victimization
within the legal system); CORTNEY A. FRANKLIN, ALONDRA D. GARZA, AMANDA GOODSON &
LEANA ALLEN BOUFFORD, CRIME VICTIMS’ INST., DOES TRAINING AFFECT RAPE AND DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE MYTH ENDORSEMENT AMONG POLICE PERSONNEL? A TREND ANALYSIS 1 (2020),
http://dev.cjcenter.org/_files/cvi/90-brief-2020-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9FW-BCEN] (attributing
low reporting rates for domestic violence and sexual assault incidents to the tendency of criminal
justice actors to secondarily victimize survivors).
16. See infra sections II.A, III.B.
17. See infra section I.A.
18. See infra section I.B.
19. See infra section I.C. There are other tactics that also serve as examples of the state’s
overarching approach to GBV victims, such as threatening to refer their case to child protective
services if they fail to cooperate with the police or prosecutor and utilizing highly aggressive interview
techniques, including “question[ing] victims until they ‘break.’” Farrell et al., supra note 8, at 158;
see also LISA A. GOODMAN & DEBORAH EPSTEIN, LISTENING TO BATTERED WOMEN: A SURVIVORCENTERED APPROACH TO ADVOCACY, MENTAL HEALTH, AND JUSTICE 76 (2008); DONNA COKER,
SANDRA PARK, JULIE GOLDSCHEID, TARA NEAL & VALERIE HALSTEAD, ACLU, RESPONSES FROM
THE FIELD: SEXUAL ASSAULT, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, AND POLICING 25 (2015).
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as well as overlooked philosophical approaches based on deontology and
liberal legal theory, simply cannot provide sound justification for their
use. The Article proposes an alternative approach for the state to adopt
towards GBV victims, rooted in the conceptualization of them as agentic
individuals, which is significantly more consistent with both relevant
empirical evidence and our normative commitments as a liberal society.
Thus far, scholars who have noted the state’s tendency to
instrumentalize victims within the criminal legal process have only done
so very briefly, without providing robust analysis of this phenomenon.20
Furthermore, scholarship discussing tactics that this Article contests has
mainly focused on singular practices as instrumentalizing or otherwise
harmful to GBV victims rather than holistically viewing the practices as
part of an overarching, multi-faceted state approach.21 The few who have
viewed them holistically have applied useful but very different conceptual
frameworks from the one employed in this Article. Two important
examples are Linda Mills’s application of a clinical and state violence (as
mimicking the dynamics of “battering relationships”) framework to the
state’s treatment of victims of domestic violence22 and Leigh Goodmark’s
analysis of the state’s approach to this same population through the lens
of prosecutorial (mis)conduct and discretion.23

20. See, e.g., supra note 6 (noting briefly that state actors treat victims as investigatory and/or
prosecutorial tools in various jurisdictions); Jessica Emerson & Alison Aminzadeh, Left Behind: How
the Absence of a Federal Vacatur Law Disadvantages Survivors of Human Trafficking, 16 U. MD.
L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 239, 246 (2016) (mentioning that prosecutors threaten certain
trafficking victims with prosecution to coerce their testimony against their trafficker, thereby treating
them as “instruments of criminal investigation” (quoting Joy Ngozi Ezeilo, Report of the Special
Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, ¶61, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/35
(Apr. 13, 2011))); Ric Simmons, Private Criminal Justice, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 911, 949 (2007)
(observing that in the traditional criminal justice process, “the victim may feel like simply a tool the
prosecution uses to obtain a conviction (which essentially is the case),” with little further discussion
of this point).
21. See, e.g., Chuang, supra note 6, at 1705 (highlighting only conditional assistance as
instrumentalizing); Russell D. Covey, Recantations and the Perjury Sword, 79 ALB. L. REV. 861,
874–75 (2015) (discussing the use and harms of perjury charges against domestic violence victims);
Njeri Mathis Rutledge, Looking a Gift Horse in the Mouth—The Underutilization of Crime Victim
Compensation Funds by Domestic Violence Victims, 19 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 223, 243–45
(2011) [hereinafter Rutledge, Gift Horse] (criticizing the conditioning of eligibility for governmentrun crime victim compensation programs upon a victim’s cooperation with law enforcement on the
grounds that it is “extortionary” and particularly harmful for domestic violence victims).
22. Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State Intervention, 113
HARV. L. REV. 550 (1999). Sabrina Balgamwalla has more recently applied this framework to the
state’s treatment of human trafficking victims. See generally Sabrina Balgamwalla, Trafficking
Rescue Initiatives as State Violence, 122 PENN ST. L. REV. 1 (2017).
23. Leigh Goodmark, The Impact of Prosecutorial Misconduct, Overreach, and Misuse of
Discretion on Gender Violence Victims, 123 DICK. L. REV. 627 (2019) [hereinafter Goodmark,
Prosecutorial Misconduct].
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In contrast, this Article employs a moral philosophical lens to analyze
the state’s approach to GBV victims more broadly. Furthermore, it draws
upon empirical evidence to examine the (mis)alignment between claimed
normative commitments justifying this approach and its impact in
practice. And importantly, it analyzes the state’s approach through key
theoretical frameworks that have thus far been overlooked in this context:
deontological ethics, dehumanization constructs, and liberal legal
principles. These frames illuminate how the state’s highly coercive and
instrumentalizing approach to GBV victims violates foundational
principles that sit at the very heart of our liberal society and are meant to
protect the human dignity of its members. These principles include
general prohibitions on treating human beings “merely as a means,”
regarding them as objects or things rather than as people, and sacrificing
individuals against their will for the sake of the greater good.24 As law has
“immanent moral content” that is also reflected in its practice,
implementation, and institutions, drawing upon moral philosophy to
analyze legal practices and procedures is an “important philosophical
project in the law.”25 Doing so enables us to identify, question, and
critique our normative commitments, and with the addition of empirical
evidence, understand whether we are indeed faithful to them in practice.
These are essential steps if we wish to make meaningful progress towards
becoming a more enlightened, self-aware, ethical, and just society.
The remainder of this Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes
several coercive practices state actors employ to force GBV victims to
participate in the criminal legal process as evidentiary tools against their
will: jailing victims through material witness warrants and contempt
power, charging or threatening criminal charges against them, and
conditioning assistance measures upon their cooperation with law
enforcement and prosecutors. Part II examines traditional justifications
for these practices, which are still advanced today to defend their use with
GBV victims. These justifications are categorized as paternalistic or
utilitarian and are analyzed through the lens of these respective conceptual
frameworks. Drawing on empirical evidence, this part exposes
fundamental inconsistencies among the goals of these frameworks and the
real-world impact of the contested practices. Part III analyzes these
practices and the instrumentalizing approach they reflect under the rubric
of three interrelated, overlooked frameworks: deontology,
dehumanization, and liberal legal theory. In doing so, it makes clear that

24. See infra sections III.A–.C.
25. See Joshua Kleinfeld, A Theory of Criminal Victimization, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1087, 1151–52
(2013).
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the state’s coercive and instrumentalizing approach often dehumanizes
GBV victims and offends their human dignity. Part IV begins by
conceptualizing state responses to GBV victims who resist being
instrumentalized as punishment for violating prevailing “ideal” and
“genuine” victim constructions, which require full cooperation with law
enforcement.26 This Part then proposes changes to the approach that
would facilitate, rather than punish, GBV victims’ exercises of agency
within their lives. A conclusion highlighting implications for the current
conversation around criminal justice reform follows.
I.

MEANS OF STATE INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF GBV
VICTIMS

Governmental actors employ various means to instrumentalize and
coerce GBV victims within the criminal legal process in furtherance of
the state’s prosecutorial goals. Some of these means reduce victims to
evidentiary tools—objects to be sacrificed for the sake of the greater good
or even in the name of the victims themselves. The results of criminologist
Amy Farrell and her collaborators’ empirical study on human trafficking
cases involving over 100 in-depth interviews with federal, state, and local
law enforcement agents and prosecutors across twelve U.S. counties
provide strong support for this notion.27 One key finding is the tendency
of police to “describe[] victims as ‘evidence’ that needed to be secured
and stabilised.”28 For example, a law enforcement agent explained, “As a
criminal investigator, I look at a victim as a piece of evidence just like that
tape recorder and so my interest is in having that evidence stabilized into
proper custody.”29 It is this very conceptualization of GBV victims that
animates a system in which it is common for state actors to

26. See Leigh Goodmark, When Is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman? When She Fights
Back, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75, 83 (2008) (asserting that the “paradigmatic battered woman” is
expected to cooperate with police and prosecutors in their pursuit of her abuser); Jayashri Srikantiah,
Perfect Victims and Real Survivors: The Iconic Victim in Domestic Human Trafficking Law, 87 B.U.
L. REV. 157, 187 (2007) (characterizing the “iconic” human trafficking victim in the U.S. as fully
cooperative with law enforcement requests); Barbara Masser, Kate Lee & Blake M. McKimmie, Bad
Woman, Bad Victim? Disentangling the Effects of Victim Stereotypicality, Gender Stereotypicality
and Benevolent Sexism on Acquaintance Rape Victim Blame, 62 SEX ROLES 494, 497 (2010)
(describing stereotypical “genuine rape victims” as “cooperat[ing] with the police in every possible
way”).
27. See AMY FARRELL, COLLEEN OWENS, JACK MCDEVITT, MEREDITH DANK, REBECCA PFEFFER,
STEPHANIE FAHY & WILLIAM ADAMS, IDENTIFYING CHALLENGES TO IMPROVE THE INVESTIGATION
AND PROSECUTION OF STATE AND LOCAL HUMAN TRAFFICKING CASES 32 (2012).
28. Amy Farrell, Monica J. DeLateur, Colleen Owens & Stephanie Fahy, The Prosecution of StateLevel Human Trafficking Cases in the United States, 6 ANTI-TRAFFICKING REV. 48, 63 (2016).
29. See FARRELL ET AL., supra note 27, at 111.
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instrumentalize them in ways that are harmful, dehumanizing, and
morally problematic. The following subsections describe several of these
troubling practices: arresting and incarcerating GBV victims through
material witness warrants and contempt power, threatening and bringing
criminal charges against them, and conditioning crucial assistance
measures upon their full cooperation with criminal legal authorities.
A.

Material Witness Warrants and Contempt Power

The practice of arresting and incarcerating victims of GBV for their
refusal or reluctance to testify has long been a means of state
instrumentalization of these individuals within the criminal legal
process.30 This practice has been documented across the U.S. at federal,
state, and local levels.31
30. See Casey G. Gwinn & Anne O’Dell, Stopping the Violence: The Role of the Police Officer and
the Prosecutor, 20 W. ST. U. L. REV. 297, 313 (1992) (explaining that the policy of employing
contempt warrants to jail any domestic violence victim who fails to appear in court has “resulted in
significant numbers of victims being arrested and incarcerated” and constitutes “the purest form of
re-victimization”); HENRY WU & ALEXANDRA YELDERMAN, HUM. TRAFFICKING LEGAL CTR.,
PROSECUTION AT ANY COST? THE IMPACT OF MATERIAL WITNESS WARRANTS IN FEDERAL HUMAN
TRAFFICKING CASES 1 (2020), http://www.htlegalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/Material-WitnessReport-FINAL-FOR-PUBLICATION_April-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/W72Z-XS37] (finding that
“[i]t is not uncommon for courts to issue these [material witness] warrants in human trafficking
prosecutions, particularly in sex trafficking cases, where the material witnesses are sometimes the
defendant’s victims”); Sarah Stillman, Why Are Prosecutors Putting Innocent Witnesses in Jail?,
NEW YORKER (Oct. 17, 2017), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-are-prosecutorsputting-innocent-witnesses-in-jail [https://perma.cc/N9SC-ZJ4P] (highlighting the nationwide trend
of arresting and jailing victims of GBV (as well as other witnesses) with material witness warrants to
compel their testimony); Alex Roth, Jailing the Victim—Courts Force Battered Women, DAILY NEWS
L.A., June 8, 1998, at N1 (reporting the jailing of a domestic violence victim by a municipal court
judge to force her to testify in her abuser’s trial); John Riley, Spouse-Abuse Victim Jailed After NoDrop Policy Invoked, 5 NAT’L L.J. 2, 2 (Aug. 22, 1983) (reporting the jailing of a domestic violence
victim, which was ordered by an Alaska District Court judge for the victim’s “adamant refusal to
testify”).
31. See, e.g., WU & YELDERMAN, supra note 30 (highlighting the incarceration of human
trafficking victims through material witness warrants in federal human trafficking cases); Stillman,
supra note 30 (noting the imprisonment of a domestic violence victim in Orleans Parish, Louisiana,
a sexual assault victim in Washington State, and a rape survivor in Harris County, Texas on material
witness warrants); Nate Morabito, Advocates Horrified After Domestic Violence Victims Jailed in
Washington County, TN, WJHL (Sept. 11, 2016, 12:21 AM), http://www.wjhl.com/news/advocateshorrified-after-domestic-violence-victims-jailed-in-washington-county-tn/ [https://perma.cc/HZH2S4T5] (reporting the arrest and jailing of more than a dozen domestic violence victims in Washington
County, Tennessee for failing to appear in court to testify against their abusers); Mitchell Byars,
Boulder DA Discusses Recent Decision to Hold Named Domestic Violence Victim in Contempt for
Refusing to Testify, DAILY CAMERA (June 13, 2021), http://www.dailycamera.com/2021/06/
13/boulder-da-discusses-recent-decision-to-hold-named-domestic-violence-victim-in-contempt-forrefusing-to-testify/ [https://perma.cc/CAW9-DLYZ] (discussing a Boulder County, Colorado district
judge’s decision to hold a domestic violence victim in contempt and jail her overnight for her refusal
to testify against her abuser).
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A material witness warrant is used to arrest and detain a witness whose
testimony is expected to be material in a criminal case and who a court
determines is unlikely to appear voluntarily.32 Not only are material
witness warrants used to jail GBV victims who are unwilling to testify,
but they are also employed to confine victims who are viewed as
unreliable—and thus potentially unlikely to respond to a subpoena—due
to mental illness, past or current addiction, homelessness, undocumented
status, or other reasons.33 Detention pursuant to material witness warrants
is synonymous with incarceration for offenders. Material witnesses are
detained in penal facilities and are “fingerprinted, photographed, shackled
and clothed in jail garb”—despite not being accused of committing any
crime.34 The number of GBV victims who are arrested and incarcerated
through material witness warrants is not possible to ascertain because
proceedings regarding these warrants are often under seal and do not
appear in docketed documents or available transcripts. Moreover, it is
frequently difficult to determine whether a detained material witness is a
victim when relevant documents are available.35 From the limited amount
of accessible information, researchers at the Human Trafficking Legal
Center were able to identify forty-nine instances of human trafficking
victims being detained as material witnesses in federal criminal
proceedings against their traffickers between 2009 and early 2020,
predominantly in sex trafficking cases.36 As these researchers
acknowledge, the actual number of trafficking victims jailed on material
witness warrants is likely to be far greater.37 Similarly, the length of
material witnesses’ detention is shrouded in secrecy, but anecdotal

32. WU & YELDERMAN, supra note 30, at 3 (noting that the federal material witness statute requires
an affidavit showing that the witness’s testimony is “material in a criminal proceeding” and that “it
may become impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena” for a material witness
warrant to be issued (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3144)). U.S. states and the District of Columbia have
material witness statutes as well. See generally NAT’L CRIME VICTIM L. INST., SURVEY OF SELECT
STATE AND FEDERAL MATERIAL WITNESS PROVISIONS (2016), http://law.lclark.edu/live/files/23521state-and-federal-material-witness-provisions [https://perma.cc/7MVJ-X5HB] [hereinafter NAT’L
CRIME VICTIM L. INST., SURVEY].
33. See WU & YELDERMAN, supra note 30, at 9–16, 20–22; Samantha Michaels, Courts Are Jailing
Victims of Sexual Assault, MOTHER JONES (Oct. 31, 2016), http://www.motherjones.com/
politics/2016/10/why-are-women-thrown-jail-after-theyre-raped-or-assaulted/ (last visited Apr. 4,
2022).
34. Preston Burton, Paige Ammons & Caroline Eisner, Coercive Process for Material Witnesses
Needs Reform, LAW360 (Mar. 24, 2019, 8:02 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/1140264/
coercive-process-for-material-witnesses-needs-reform [https://perma.cc/F7XS-UYH4].
35. See id; WU & YELDERMAN, supra note 30, at 4.
36. WU & YELDERMAN, supra note 30, at 3–4.
37. Id. at 4.
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examples range from overnight to months for GBV victims.38
Another means used to arrest and incarcerate GBV victims who are
unwilling to testify is the court’s contempt power. Unlike material witness
warrants, which authorize preemptive arrest and detention, contempt
power is used to arrest and detain subpoenaed victim-witnesses after they
do not appear in court at the designated time or refuse to testify when
there. If a witness defies a subpoena, the court can hold her39 in contempt
and order her arrest and detention, sua sponte or on a party’s motion.40 A
prosecutor may also file contempt charges against a recalcitrant witness
who has been subpoenaed and request a warrant for her arrest.41 The
38. See, e.g., Alex Barber, Prosecutor Orders Arrest of Woman as Material Witness to Testify
Against
Her
Alleged
Abuser,
BANGOR
DAILY
NEWS
(Sept.
20,
2013),
http://bangordailynews.com/2013/09/20/news/prosecutor-orders-arrest-of-woman-as-materialwitness-to-testify-against-her-alleged-abuser/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2022) (reporting the arrest and
overnight jailing of a domestic violence victim in Maine on a material witness warrant); Kevin
McGill, City Council Votes to End Jailing Uncooperative Victims, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 7, 2019),
http://apnews.com/article/218cc9c448944e499a66df70ed9631a3 (last visited Apr. 4, 2022)
(describing a lawsuit in which a plaintiff who is a sex trafficking victim alleges that she was
incarcerated for more than 100 days on a material witness warrant); Michaels, supra note 33
(reporting the jailing of a sexual abuse victim in Oregon for approximately fifty days and a rape victim
in Texas for about a month on material witness warrants); WU & YELDERMAN, supra note 30, at 8–
10, 16, 19–20 (describing examples of human trafficking victims being detained on material witness
warrants for periods ranging from one night to at least six weeks).
39. In line with other scholarship on GBV, I employ female pronouns when referring to victims
and male pronouns when referring to perpetrators because this is the most common gender dynamic
at play for these types of crimes. See, e.g., Daniel Maggen, “When You’re a Star”: The Unnamed
Wrong of Sexual Degradation, 109 GEO. L.J. 581, 594 n.77 (2021) (“Given that an overwhelming
share of victims of sexual wrongdoing are female and the perpetrators male, I use mostly gendered
pronouns that reflect this proportion.”); Natalie Nanasi, Disarming Domestic Abusers, 14 HARV. L &
POL’Y REV. 559, 561 n.13 (2020) (“Although both men and women experience intimate partner abuse,
this Article uses female pronouns to refer to survivors because men and women are not equally
impacted by violence in the home . . . .”); Merle H. Weiner, Legal Counsel for Survivors of Campus
Sexual Violence, 29 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 125, 125 n.5 (2017) (“The female pronoun is used to refer
to the survivor and the male pronoun is used to refer to the alleged perpetrator. These pronouns reflect
the generally gendered nature of campus sexual assault.”). However, it is important to recognize that
men and non-binary individuals can also be victims of GBV and that women and non-binary
individuals can be perpetrators.
40. See 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) (“A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or
imprisonment, or both, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority . . . as . . . [d]isobedience or
resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a)
(“Whenever a witness in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United
States refuses without just cause shown to comply with an order of the court to testify . . . the
court . . . may summarily order his confinement at a suitable place until such time as the witness is
willing to give such testimony. . . . No period of such confinement shall exceed the life of . . . the
court proceeding . . . but in no event shall such confinement exceed eighteen months.”); Paul A.
Grote, Note, Purging Contempt: Eliminating the Distinction Between Civil and Criminal Contempt,
88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1247, 1269 (2011); NAT’L CRIME VICTIM L. INST., SURVEY, supra note 32.
41. See Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence
Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1854 n.17, 1864 (1996); Morabito, supra note 31 (reporting
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length of incarceration pursuant to civil contempt orders is often tied to
the victim’s will—offering release upon a decision to comply and become
the state’s evidentiary tool.42 For example, a Nebraska trial court judge
held an adult survivor of child sexual abuse in contempt for refusing to
testify and ordered her imprisonment for “90 days or until such time as
she testifies as ordered, whichever occurs first.”43 The Nebraska Supreme
Court affirmed this order on appeal.44
The following transcript excerpts exemplify the dynamics around the
state’s instrumentalization of GBV victims by means of material witness
warrants and contempt power, particularly the potential for serious
harm.45 The victim featured in the excerpts is a nineteen-year-old survivor
of child sex trafficking.46
[ASSISTANT
U.S.
ATTORNEY]: . . . Ms.
[Elaine]
REDACTED does not want to testify at the trial. The government
has served her with a subpoena to testify.
...
[VICTIM’S MOTHER]: Elaine was on another case last
year. . . . And she’s trying to overcome certain things that’s
traumatized her from that last case. And, for her, at this time, it’s
like a—a rolling stone to what that last case was to be presented
into this new case, that for her understanding, . . . because she has
bipolar disorder and some other tendencies, as well . . . . For her,
it is a stressful, hurting thing to do. And we’ve just come, at this
point in time in her life, where she is starting to do something
positive with herself, and starting to learn to love and respect
herself in trying to understand that what has happened to her is
not her fault. So, right now, it’s very overwhelming for her.
...
THE COURT: . . . . I mean the trouble is in these cases, that you
can be held as a material witness and, that, I don’t think would be
a wise thing for us to get into.

that prosecutors in Tennessee filed contempt charges against and requested arrest warrants for
domestic violence victims based on their defiance of a subpoena).
42. Civil contempt is “coercive or remedial in nature” and “the usual sanction is to confine the
contemnor until he or she complies with the court order.” Contempt, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(11th ed. 2019). In contrast, criminal contempt is “punitive in nature” and any confinement of the
contemnor imposed as a sanction must be for a definite period. Id.
43. State v. Riensche, 812 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Neb. 2012).
44. Id. at 301.
45. Transcript of Hearing at 3–4, United States v. Corley, 2016 WL 9022508 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15,
2016) (No. 13-cr-48) [hereinafter Transcript of Nov. 6, 2013].
46. Id.
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...
[VICTIM’S MOTHER]: Well what is the kind of penalty if she
does not testify. What’s the—what would happen?
THE COURT: She would be ordered to. She can be held in
contempt of court for not testifying, and be put in jail for not
testifying if she, you know, disobeys the Court order.
...
[VICTIM]: . . . I don’t want to do this. I would rather go to jail
than testify. I said already I don’t want to do something, I’m not
going to be forced to do something I do not want to do.
...
[VICTIM’S MOTHER]: Elaine is not—is—is just not fit right
now to do this. . . . [W]e’ve come a long way with her, trying to
get her back, stable to where she was. Elaine already does not
sleep at night. Elaine still hears voices. Elaine is—is just getting
by by a thread to live life, as it is now, to even deal and cope. She
just started a new job two days ago. And, she was just starting to
come out and try to blossom and be where she needs to be. And
for this to come, right now, in her life, for something that she
feels, because she has only seen that person once or twice, have
only had a relationship with him once or twice, why do I need to
testify—this is her thinking, her way of thinking.
...
[PUBLIC DEFENDER ON DUTY]: Having spoken with Ms.
REDACTED, she, at this point, is 100 percent—mathematically
impossible, but 110 percent adamant that she would rather, as she
puts it, go to jail than testify. I have had some conversations with
the U.S. Attorneys, the assistants in the case. Obviously, we hope,
all of us, I hope, it doesn’t come to that. We don’t want Elaine to
suffer more than she already has[.]
[VICTIM]: I feel like I already am.
...
THE COURT: Has anyone talked to you about . . . this case? Any
third party? Has anyone approached to you and talked to you
about this?
[VICTIM]: No.
THE COURT: So, no one has tried to tell you not to testify?
...
[VICTIM]: I don’t feel that, in any way, somebody is threatening
my life, no. This is—I don’t feel, in a way, like somebody is trying
to threaten me not to do this. This is something I do not want to
do. Nobody’s telling me you better not do this. This is how I feel.
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...
[PUBLIC DEFENDER ON DUTY]: I have also explained, just
to be clear, your Honor, that Ms. REDACTED’s experience with
her prior testimony was in State court. State prosecutors are less
inclined to use the power of their office to hold people in
contempt. And I think it’s a much more common occurrence in
this building, than it is across the street.
THE COURT: I know. That’s the sort of thing—that is the reason
I asked whether she talked to anyone else. Because the people
have misconceptions. They know what happens across the street,
they don’t know what happens here.
...
[VICTIM’S MOTHER]: She’s not going to do it. Like I’m trying
to tell you, she’s not mentally fit to do this. . . . I’m not having her
go to jail. I’ll go to jail. We are not going to do this and put her
through this if she does not want to do this. You see how this is
affecting her. . . . [S]he’s been through enough. And just to go
through the situation of entering into a court door, sitting in a
room to wait to be called into the thing, is not doing nothing but
traumatizing her more. Because she’s thinking about the
rape. . . . I’m not going to have her pushed over the deep end
because she don’t want to do something. She shouldn’t be forced
to do something that she does not want to do.47
This example demonstrates the seriousness of the potential
consequences for many GBV victims and those who care about them
when the state threatens to use its power to jail them for the purpose of
compelling their testimony. The victim’s mother makes her daughter’s
psychological issues and the precarity of her mental state clear, including
the trauma resulting from doing the very thing the state is attempting to
force her to do again—testify in a criminal case. The mother convincingly
asserts that testifying against her trafficker will cause her daughter to have
a mental health crisis and reverse the recent progress she had finally made
towards recovery. However, this information does not appear to even give
the judge (or the prosecutors present) pause to reconsider whether he
should be attempting to force her to testify against her will. The judge
misleadingly speaks as if it is out of his hands, even though he would be
the one to sign any material witness or contempt warrants for the victim’s
arrest and confinement. Because of the willingness of state actors to use
their coercive powers against this trafficking victim, she is faced with
harsh consequences no matter what she chooses: the pains of arrest and

47. Id. at 3–4, 7, 9, 11–14, 16–17.

Wechsler (Do Not Delete)

522

6/21/22 10:47 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:507

imprisonment or the pains of re-traumatization from recounting traumatic
experiences in an adversarial setting against her will.48 Both run a high
risk of causing her to experience a crisis, given her severe mental health
issues. Notably, the victim asserts that she “already” feels that she is
experiencing additional suffering.49 The agony that the mother would
experience from watching her daughter suffer from either of these options
is also apparent. This example thus elucidates some of the harms that
victims and their families face when the state treats them as sacrificial
objects. And in the end, the state’s threats against Elaine achieved their
aim: she testified as a prosecution witness against her wishes.50
B.

Criminal Charges

Prosecutors often utilize their power to threaten or bring criminal
charges against GBV victims as a means of gaining their acquiescence to
being used as prosecutorial tools. As discussed in the preceding
subsection, prosecutors may threaten or file contempt charges against
victims who defy a subpoena.51 But there are also other, often more
serious, charges that prosecutors use as leverage in their dealings with
GBV victims. For example, they employ charges for sex trafficking
offenses to coerce “bottoms”—victims whom traffickers appoint as their
“lead prostitute” and offer certain responsibilities and/or privileges—into
testifying and otherwise participating in the prosecution of their
traffickers.52 Many “bottoms” engage in conduct prohibited by trafficking
statutes, such as recruiting, transporting, and coercing other victims,
because they are under their trafficker’s control.53 But Farrell et al.’s study
also documents prosecutors and law enforcement using this practice more
generally with sex trafficking victims, including those who are not
“bottom[s].”54 A law enforcement agent interviewed in the study
explained:
[Sex trafficking victims] did [provide information] after they got
arrested when we were like, “Do you want to be a witness, or do
you want to be suspect? Decide.” So, we charged these folks as
48. See infra notes 131–134 and accompanying text.
49. Transcript of Nov. 6, 2013, supra note 45, at 12.
50. See Transcript of Direct Examination at 255–56, 305, United States v. Corley, 2016 WL
9022508 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2016) (No. 13-cr-48).
51. See supra note 41.
52. Sarah Crocker, Note, Stripping Agency from Top to Bottom: The Need for a Sentencing
Guideline Safety Valve for Bottoms Prosecuted Under the Federal Sex Trafficking Statutes, 111 NW.
U. L. REV. 753, 753, 771–72, 777–82 (2017).
53. Id. at 772–75, 781.
54. FARRELL ET AL., supra note 27, at 197.
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co-conspirators to the organization and once they came in they
got charged with felony prostitution and felony conspiracy. They
were like, “No. I may have been a prostitute, but I’m not involved
in child prostitution. I don’t know what you’re talking about.”
And they became cooperative witnesses. Which is what we
wanted. That was the hardest part to sell to the DA’s office to try.
It was very successful. All of these girls rolled and became
cooperative witnesses so they could go back to just a regular
prostitution charge and testified on the conspiracy. And so, we
ended up with exactly what we had anticipated.55
The practice of charging or threatening charges against GBV victims
exerts powerful pressure upon them to comply with the state’s demands,56
especially when the offenses carry significant mandatory minimum
sentences.57 When facing ten- or fifteen-year minimum sentences, many
victims reasonably feel that they have no choice but to accept a plea deal
that includes testifying against their trafficker.58
Police and prosecutors also use prostitution arrests and charges as
means of instrumentalizing sex trafficking victims as sources of
information and evidence for human trafficking cases. In doing so,
authorities communicate to victims that these charges will be dropped if
they acquiesce.59 Evidence of this practice also emerged in Farrell et al.’s
research.60 For example, one prosecutor interviewed for this study
explained, “You can’t get [to] [a trafficking charge] without breaking a
few eggs . . . at some point in time you’ve got to be willing to charge some

55. Id. at 116–17 (second alteration in original).
56. For example, in a 2015-2016 National Survivor Network survey of human trafficking survivors
in which nearly a third of the 130 respondents reported having felt pressure from law enforcement to
testify against their traffickers, one respondent explained, “I was scared they told me if I didn’t tell
they would keep arresting me& keep me in jail for a very long time[.]” Another recalled, “I was told
they would go after me for tax evasion and I would get 20+ years and take my daughter, whom I
would never see again. They also told me my mom would go to prison for living off the proceeds of
a prostitute and she would die in prison.” BETH JACOBS & STEPHANIE RICHARD, NAT’L SURVIVOR
NETWORK, NATIONAL SURVIVOR NETWORK MEMBERS SURVEY: IMPACT OF CRIMINAL ARREST AND
DETENTION
ON
SURVIVORS
OF
HUMAN
TRAFFICKING
2,
5
(2016),
http://nationalsurvivornetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/VacateSurveyFinal.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/ZW9T-NV5M].
57. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(b), 2422(b), 2423(a) (setting out mandatory minimum sentences
for human trafficking and pimping offenses).
58. See Crocker, supra note 52, at 777–80.
59. See Farrell et al., supra note 28, at 63–65; Lauren Hersh, Sex Trafficking Investigations and
Prosecutions, in SUP. CT. STATE N.Y. & N.Y. STATE JUD. COMM. ON WOMEN COURTS, LAWYER’S
MANUAL ON HUMAN TRAFFICKING: PURSUING JUSTICE VICTIMS 255, 260 (Jill Laurie Goodman &
Dorchen A. Leidholdt eds., 2013).
60. Farrell et al., supra note 28, at 63–65.
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of these girls with prostitution[.]”61 Furthermore, domestic sex trafficking
survivors in Love et al.’s study, which was conducted in eight cities across
the U.S., reported that prosecutors had leveraged prostitution, drug
possession, and other charges against them for the purpose of coercing
their participation in criminal prosecutions against their traffickers.62
Prosecutors often require victims to comply within a short time frame to
avoid criminalization.63 In her examination of prostitution arrest and
prosecution policies in New York City, public defender Kate Mogulescu
noted, “[s]hould the [sex trafficking] victims be unwilling or unready [to
cooperate], at the precise moment of arrest, or immediately thereafter,
they are made to go through the criminal court process marked as
defendants.”64
Some prosecutors and even judges threaten GBV victims with perjury
charges in an effort to prevent them from recanting their allegations
against their abusers and to coerce them to testify consistently with their
earlier statements.65 The threat of perjury charges is often sufficient to
prevent victims from recanting or changing their stories, thereby
providing prosecutors with the evidence they need for a conviction.66
However, at times the threat alone does not outweigh victims’ reasons for

61. Id. at 64.
62. HANNAH LOVE, JEANETTE HUSSEMANN, LILLY YU, EVELYN MCCOY & COLLEEN OWENS,
URB. INST., JUSTICE IN THEIR OWN WORDS: PERCEPTIONS AND EXPERIENCES OF (IN)JUSTICE AMONG
HUMAN
TRAFFICKING
SURVIVORS
1,
7,
14
(2018),
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/97351/justice_in_their_own_words_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P2Q8-KB56].
63. Kate Mogulescu, The Public Defender as Anti-trafficking Advocate, an Unlikely Role: How
Current New York City Arrest and Prosecution Policies Systematically Criminalize Victims of Sex
Trafficking, 15 CUNY L. REV. 471, 481 (2012).
64. Id.; see also Amy Farrell, Meredith Dank, Ieke de Vries, Matthew Kafafian, Andrea Hughes &
Sarah Lockwood, Failing Victims? Challenges of the Police Response to Human Trafficking, 18
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 649, 664 (2019) (finding that it often takes a long time for trafficking
victims to recognize their exploitation and victimhood, which is in tension with law enforcement’s
aims of quickly securing victim statements and evidence).
65. See Goodmark, Prosecutorial Misconduct, supra note 23, at 641; Thomas L. Kirsch II,
Problems in Domestic Violence: Should Victims Be Forced to Participate in the Prosecution of Their
Abusers?, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 383, 403 (2001); Njeri Mathis Rutledge, Turning a Blind
Eye: Perjury in Domestic Violence Cases, 39 N.M. L. REV. 149, 155–56, 162 (2009); see also, e.g.,
State v. Gutierrez, 2014-NMSC-031, ¶¶ 7–16, 333 P.3d 247, 250–51 (detailing prosecutor,
investigator, and district attorney office victim advocate’s visit to a teenage victim of criminal sexual
contact at her school, during which they privately threatened to charge her with perjury and take her
young son away if she denied the abuse during her upcoming trial testimony); State v. Hancock, 2004Ohio-1492U, ¶¶ 16–32, No. C-030459, 2004 WL 596103, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2004)
(indicating that the trial judge had threatened a domestic violence victim with five years’
imprisonment for perjury during her testimony because she had deviated from her earlier statements
to police).
66. Covey, supra note 21, at 875.
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recanting, and some prosecutors then follow through with prosecuting
them for perjury.67
C.

Conditioning Assistance upon Cooperation

Conditioning assistance for GBV victims upon their cooperation with
criminal legal authorities is often used as a means of facilitating victims’
instrumentalization within the criminal legal process. Victims typically
have significant needs as they exit and in the aftermath of their GBV
situation. These needs vary depending upon the particular victim and her
circumstances, but can range across financial, legal, health, housing,
safety, transportation, and other areas.68 The state often exploits these
needs by tying measures to ameliorate them to victims’ willingness to
assist the state with realizing its prosecutorial goals.69 This is done both
structurally, through formal laws and policies, and more informally,
through approaches to interacting with victims. The latter is reflected in
Farrell et al.’s most recent study of responses to human trafficking in the
U.S., in which police officers interviewed “stressed the need to connect
victims to services primarily for the purpose of securing [their]
cooperation and developing a case against the perpetrator.”70
Furthermore, the researchers found that “although some police [they]
interviewed used a social service approach as a means to be more effective

67. Id.; Goodmark, Prosecutorial Misconduct, supra note 23, at 641–42; see also, e.g., Domestic
Violence Victim Sent to Jail for Lying for Her Abuser, CBS L.A. (Apr. 23, 2011, 12:01 AM),
http://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2011/04/23/domestic-violence-victim-sent-to-jail-for-lying-for-herabuser/ [https://perma.cc/VM9N-N7TD] (reporting the jailing of a domestic violence victim for six
months following her perjury conviction for denying that her abuser had repeatedly beaten her);
Maureen O’Hagan, In Baltimore, a Victim Becomes a Criminal, WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2001),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/03/30/in-baltimore-a-victim-becomes-acriminal/69e9f6f5-ef03-41dd-9338-aa3d771ff0c0/ [https://perma.cc/JB8Z-PQ7R] (describing the
incarceration of a domestic violence victim for thirty months for perjury and obstruction of justice
after she lied during her compelled grand jury testimony in an attempt to protect her abuser).
68. See Nathaniel A. Dell, Brandy R. Maynard, Kara R. Born, Elizabeth Wagner, Bonnie Atkins &
Whitney House, Helping Survivors of Human Trafficking: A Systematic Review of Exit and Postexit
Interventions, 20 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 183, 184, 191 (2019); Melissa E. Dichter & Karin
V. Rhodes, Intimate Partner Violence Survivors’ Unmet Social Service Needs, 37 J. SOC. SERV. RSCH.
481, 481–83, 485–87 (2011); Shanti Kulkarni, Intersectional Trauma-Informed Intimate Partner
Violence (IPV) Services: Narrowing the Gap Between IPV Service Delivery and Survivor Needs, 34
J. FAM. VIOLENCE 55, 56–58 (2018).
69. For example, in its 2015–2016 survey of human trafficking survivors, the National Survivor
Network found that 22.2% of the 130 respondents reported having “felt like they had to testify against
their trafficker to get help or services.” One respondent recalled, “In order to get victim witness
assistance I had to sign papers saying I would testify against my trafficker in court. If I accepted
financial assistance and then refused to testify the program could then sue me for the assistance
money.” JACOBS & RICHARD, supra note 56, at 5.
70. Farrell et al., supra note 64, at 664.
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in their work, the goals of arrest and prosecution continue to outweigh
meeting victim needs.”71
Informal approaches to exploiting GBV victims’ needs in an attempt to
secure their cooperation often come into play in the process of victim
identification, which is a prerequisite to receiving services intended for
GBV victims.72 For example, regarding sex trafficking victims who have
been arrested and charged with prostitution in New York City, Mogulescu
explains that they “must cooperate in the specific way deemed appropriate
by prosecutors in order to qualify for the ‘benefits’ of identification as a
victim.”73 She further highlights the difficulty facing victims who must
decide “whether to cooperate before they have been provided services or
an opportunity to develop stability and independence.”74 Practices such as
this one, which require victims to commit to assisting law enforcement in
order to receive services, implicate stereotyped constructions of “real”
GBV victims as fully cooperative with police and prosecutors in the
pursuit of their abusers.75 As a result, many victims who choose not to
cooperate with law enforcement are not afforded legitimate victim status,
which often places much-needed services and assistance out of their
reach.
Moreover, there are formal, structural links between certain victim
assistance measures and cooperation with law enforcement. One
significant example is state-run crime victim compensation programs
71. Id.
72. See David R. Hodge, Assisting Victims of Human Trafficking: Strategies to Facilitate
Identification, Exit from Trafficking, and the Restoration of Wellness, 59 SOC. WORK 111, 113 (2014);
see also JACLYN HOUSTON-KOLNIK & AMANDA L. VASQUEZ, ILL. CRIM. JUST. INFO. AUTH., VICTIM
SERVICE DELIVERY: ILLINOIS PROVIDERS’ PERSPECTIVES ON VICTIM SERVICE BARRIERS AND
AGENCY CAPACITY 11 (2017), https://ncvc.dspacedirect.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11990/
3756/322.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/Q6WZ-EAMT]. Many GBV victims who
obtain social services access them through law enforcement referrals. See Farrell et al., supra note 64,
at 664. However, this is certainly not the only means by which victims obtain services. Regardless of
whether police, a government social services agency, or a non-profit organization first encounters a
victim, she must be identified as such in order to access services available for GBV victims, such as
shelters for domestic violence and/or human trafficking victims and support from specialized GBV
organizations. Depending on the organization’s particular practices, the identification process may be
based partially or wholly upon an individual’s self-identification as a victim of GBV. See, e.g.,
KATHLEEN TURNER, MICHELLE ANDERSON & STEFANIE LOPEZ-HOWARD, GA. CRIM. JUST.
COORDINATING COUNCIL, ASSESSING THE SCOPE AND AVAILABILITY OF SERVICES FOR HUMAN
TRAFFICKING VICTIMS AMONG GEORGIA’S VICTIMS’ SERVICES PROVIDERS 17–18 (2014),
http://cjcc.georgia.gov/document/human-trafficking-victim-services-needs-assessment/download
[https://perma.cc/B8NE-DC5Z] (finding that ten out of forty responding Georgia victim services
agencies reported that victim self-identification was the method they most frequently used to identify
human trafficking victims).
73. Mogulescu, supra note 63, at 481.
74. Id.
75. See supra note 26.
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(CVCPs). Every state in the U.S. has a statutorily created CVCP,76 which
also receives federal funding through the Victims of Crime Act
(VOCA).77 These programs reimburse eligible crime victims for expenses
related to their victimization, such as medical care, mental health
counseling, lost wages, and moving costs.78 However, eligibility criteria
for most, if not all, CVCPs include cooperation in the investigation and
prosecution of the perpetrator.79 This is unsurprising given VOCA’s
requirement that state CVCPs “promote[] victim cooperation with the
reasonable requests of law enforcement authorities” in order to receive
federal funding.80 The conditioning of compensation upon cooperation
with law enforcement has undoubtedly contributed to GBV victims’
underutilization of CVCPs,81 and in turn, their lack of access to funds
which could vastly improve their financial situations and even enable
them to avoid future victimization.82
In July 2021, Congress amended VOCA and added an exception to the
requirement that CVCPs promote victim cooperation with law
enforcement when a CVCP “determines such cooperation may be
impacted due to a victim’s age, physical condition, psychological state,

76. Crime Victim Compensation: A Valuable Resource for Victim Recovery, NAT’L CRIME VICTIM
L. INST. (Lewis & Clark Law School, Portland, OR), Sept. 2016, at 1,
http://law.lclark.edu/live/files/25182-ncvli-newsletter—-victim-compensation-processpdf
[https://perma.cc/PV7A-JV3B] [hereinafter Victim Compensation, NAT’L CRIME VICTIM L. INST.].
77. 34 U.S.C. § 20102.
78. Victim Compensation, NAT’L CRIME VICTIM L. INST., supra note 76.
79. Id.
80. 34 U.S.C. § 20102(b)(2).
81. For example, CVCPs paid compensation to only 254 human trafficking victims and 45,170
victims of adult sexual assault/stalking during fiscal year 2018. See OFF. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME,
VICTIMS OF CRIME ACT VICTIM COMPENSATION FORMULA GRANT PROGRAM: FISCAL YEAR 2018
DATA ANALYSIS REPORT 4, 8, 11 (2020), http://ovc.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh226/files/media/
document/2018-voca-annual-compensation-performance-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/8D6C-X2HL].
By comparison, there were 52,459 trafficking victims and 693,731 victims of adult sexual
assault/stalking who were clients of VOCA-funded service providers during that same period. See
OFF. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, VICTIMS OF CRIME ACT VICTIM ASSISTANCE FORMULA GRANT
PROGRAM:
FISCAL
YEAR
2018
DATA
ANALYSIS
REPORT
2,
5–6
(2020),
http://ovc.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh226/files/media/document/2018-voca-annual-assistanceperformance-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/UVP2-LJF7]. Thus, only a very small fraction of known
trafficking and adult sexual assault/stalking victims received compensation from CVCPs—0.48% and
6.5%, respectively—and these figures are likely to be significantly lower when accounting for victims
of these crimes who are not clients of VOCA-funded service providers.
82. See Rutledge, Gift Horse, supra note 21, at 228, 232–33, 243–45. See generally GLADYS
MCLEAN & SARAH GONZALEZ BOCINSKI, INST. WOMEN’S POL’Y RSCH, THE ECONOMIC COST OF
INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, SEXUAL ASSAULT, AND STALKING (2017), http://iwpr.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/10/B367_Economic-Impacts-of-IPV-08.14.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/YF2HJCGU] (summarizing the literature on the many financial hardships that survivors of intimate partner
violence, sexual assault, and stalking often face, including medical debt, lost wages, and poor credit).

Wechsler (Do Not Delete)

528

6/21/22 10:47 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:507

cultural or linguistic barriers, or any other health or safety concern that
jeopardizes the victim’s wellbeing[.]”83 Yet, this exception to the
cooperation rule is vague and merely permits, rather than requires, state
CVCPs to allow victims whose well-being is jeopardized for one of the
enumerated reasons to receive compensation without first cooperating
with law enforcement requests.84 Problematically, it also fails to include
many of the reasons why GBV victims may not wish to accede to law
enforcement requests, including economic, temporal, relational, and
community-based concerns.85 Thus, the cooperation condition is likely to
remain a structural barrier for many GBV victims in need of compensation
going forward.
Structural links conditioning assistance upon cooperation also exist for
the many victims of GBV who are undocumented immigrants.86
Immigration relief in the form of the T visa for human trafficking victims
and the U visa for victims of domestic violence, female genital mutilation,
rape, sexual assault, sexual exploitation, abusive sexual contact, or human
trafficking (among other serious crimes) require victims to cooperate with
law enforcement in the investigation and prosecution of the perpetrators.87
There is a limited exception for T visa applicants who are minors or who

83. VOCA Fix to Sustain the Crime Victims Fund Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-27, 135 Stat. 301
(codified as amended at 34 U.S.C. § 20102(2)(b)(2)); OFF. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, OVC BULL.,
VOCA FIX EXCEPTION RE: VOCA COMPENSATION ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENT TO PROMOTE VICTIM
COOPERATION
WITH
LAW
ENFORCEMENT
(2021),
http://ovc.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/
xyckuh226/files/media/document/ovc-compensation-bulletin-9.20.21.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VVZVLPZ].
84. VOCA Fix to Sustain the Crime Victims Fund Act of 2021 § 2(b)(2). In addition, the
amendment’s wording regarding the exception is vague because it refers to a victim’s cooperation
potentially being impacted due to one of the enumerated issues instead of referring to a victim’s wellbeing potentially being impacted by cooperation with law enforcement.
85. Specific examples include dependence upon the defendant’s income, a desire to avoid a lengthy
legal process, and distrust of the police. See Sara C. Hare, What Do Battered Women Want? Victims’
Opinions on Prosecution, 21 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 611, 614–16, 623–24, 626 (2006); Nichols, supra
note 12; Jessica Pishko, The Defund Movement Aims to Change the Policing and Prosecution of
Domestic Violence, TYPE INVESTIGATIONS (July 28, 2020), http://www.typeinvestigations.org/
investigation/2020/07/28/the-defund-movement-aims-to-change-the-policing-and-prosecution-ofdomestic-violence/ [https://perma.cc/S4XB-EGXK].
86. See Nadine Shaanta Murshid & Elizabeth A. Bowen, A Trauma-Informed Analysis of the
Violence Against Women Act’s Provisions for Undocumented Immigrant Women, 24 VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 1540, 1541–42, 1545 (2018); OFF. TO MONITOR AND COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN
PERSONS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 517–19 (20th ed. 2020).
Undocumented status is a vulnerability that perpetrators of GBV often exploit to keep their victims
under their control. Hilary Axam & Soumya Silver, Human Trafficking Enforcement and the Rule of
Law, 67 DOJ J. FED. L. & PRAC. 93, 93–94, 98 (2019); Natalie Nanasi, The U Visa’s Failed Promise
for Survivors of Domestic Violence, 29 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 273, 306–07 (2018).
87. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(U)(i)(III), (a)(15)(U)(iii), (a)(15)(T)(i)(III)(aa).
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are unable to cooperate due to physical or psychological trauma,88 but this
exception is not available for U visa applicants.89 Furthermore, a
mandatory part of the U visa application is a certification from law
enforcement, a judge or other investigatory authority of the applicant’s
helpfulness90 whereas the T visa application allows for the submission of
any “credible evidence” of compliance with reasonable requests from law
enforcement instead.91 This distinction is significant because empirical
research has revealed that many law enforcement agencies across the U.S.
refuse to complete the certification form required for U visa eligibility in
spite of victims’ helpfulness with investigating or prosecuting the criminal
activity, for wholly discretionary reasons not included in or aligned with
the U visa statute, regulations, or Department of Homeland
Security/USCIS guidance.92 Studies have found that these reasons include
a belief that the victim may stop cooperating after the certification is
signed, the lack of an arrest, prosecution or conviction, the view that the
victim did not suffer sufficient injury or harm, and the passage of an
(arbitrary) time period since the date the offense occurred.93 Yet, the mere
possibility of “potentially life-saving immigration status” is enough of an
inducement for many GBV victims to fully cooperate with law
enforcement, even when doing so undermines their particular goals,

88. Id. § (a)(15)(T)(i)(III)(bb)–(cc).
89. Nanasi, supra note 86, at 314. However, if a U visa applicant is under the age of 16, the victim’s
parent, guardian, or friend is permitted to assist authorities with investigating or prosecuting the crime
instead—but there is no exception to the requirement that the victim or one of these other individuals
does so. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i)(III).
90. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(1).
91. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., USCIS, OMB NO. 1615-0104, INSTRUCTIONS FOR PETITION FOR U
NONIMMIGRANT STATUS AND SUPPLEMENT A, PETITION FOR QUALIFYING FAMILY MEMBER OF U-1
RECIPIENT (2021), http://.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/forms/i-918instr.pdf [https://perma.
cc/EF4N-MYA8]; DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., USCIS, OMB NO. 1615-0099, INSTRUCTIONS FOR
APPLICATION FOR T NONIMMIGRANT STATUS 8 (2021), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/
files/document/forms/i-914instr.pdf [https://perma.cc/429D-6866].
92. See JEAN ABREU, SIDNEY FOWLER, NINA HOLTSBERRY, ASHLEY KLEIN, KEVIN SCHROEDER,
MELANIE STRATTON LOPEX & DEBORAH M. WEISSMAN, UNC SCH. OF L. IMMIGR./HUM. RTS. POL’Y
CLINIC & ASISTA, THE POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE U VISA: ELIGIBILITY AS A MATTER OF
LOCALE 3, 27–29, 47–65 (2014), http://unc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/uvisafullreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q6RC-994W]; NATALIA LEE, DANIEL J. QUINONES, NAWAL AMMAR & LESLYE E.
ORLOFF, NAT’L IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S ADVOC. PROJECT & AM. UNIV. WASH. COLL. OF L.,
NATIONAL SURVEY OF SERVICE PROVIDERS ON POLICE RESPONSE TO IMMIGRANT CRIME VICTIMS,
U
VISA
CERTIFICATION
AND
LANGUAGE
ACCESS
13–20
(2013),
http://masslegalservices.org/system/files/library/Police%20Response%20U%20Visas%20Language
%20Access%20Report%20NIWAP%20%204%2016%2013%20FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/32WY-QMHK].
93. ABREU ET AL., supra note 92, at 28–29, 48–49, 51–55, 57–58; LEE ET AL., supra note 92, at
13–14.
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priorities, and safety.94 As legal scholar Natalie Nanasi keenly observes,
“in practice, by requiring survivors to cooperate with law enforcement in
order to obtain U nonimmigrant status, benefits to police and prosecutors
are achieved at the expense of the victims[.]”95
II.

TRADITIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR COERCING AND
INSTRUMENTALIZING GBV VICTIMS

Justifications for the use of the highly coercive and instrumentalizing
practices described above can generally be categorized as paternalistic or
utilitarian—focusing on purported benefit to individual GBV victims or
to society as a whole, respectively. Yet, there is fundamental
misalignment between the normative commitments of these approaches
and the actual impact of the practices at issue. Drawing on empirical
research, the following subsections demonstrate how the rhetoric does not
match reality, thereby rendering the proffered justifications insufficient.
A.

Paternalism

Paternalism is the interference with an individual’s liberty or autonomy
without her consent on the basis of purported benefit to or protection from
harm for that individual.96 The U.S. had a long tradition of gender
paternalism within its customs, common law, and constitutional
jurisprudence, a regime which was not repudiated until the 1970s.97 It
justified limits on women’s freedom with claims that these restrictions
benefitted and protected them.98 Major premises underlying this system
were that women lack the capacity to make rational and responsible
choices within their lives and need protection from male coercion.99
Paternalistic justifications for coercing and instrumentalizing victims of
GBV within the criminal legal process against their will reflect vestiges

94. See Nanasi, supra note 86, at 293–97, 304–06.
95. Id. at 273.
96. See Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, 56 MONIST 64, 65 (1992); Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism,
STAN.
ENCYC.
PHIL.
(Sept.
9,
2020),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paternalism
[https://perma.cc/UB7U-WFYB].
97. Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under
Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1773–80, 1792 (2008). For example, in rejecting the common
law of coverture in Frontiero v. Richardson, the Court observed that “an attitude of ‘romantic
paternalism’ which, in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage” had led to “our
statute books gradually bec[oming] laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes.” 411
U.S. 677, 684–85 (1973).
98. Siegel, supra note 97, at 1775–79.
99. Id.
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of this outdated, harmful approach.100 “Like old forms of gender
paternalism, the[se] new forms of gender paternalism [attempt to] remedy
harm to women through the control of women”101—ironically addressing
the threat of male coercion with coercion from the patriarchal state.
This approach is clearly manifested in the justifications many state
actors give when they employ the instrumentalizing and coercive
practices described in Part I. For example, at the ribbon-cutting ceremony
for a (now-defunct) government-run domestic violence shelter that only
accepted victims who promised to testify against their abusers, Honolulu
prosecutor Keith Kaneshiro asserted that his office “did a lot of things to
help victims of domestic violence, even when the victims did not know
what’s good for them.”102 Another example is the explanation a District
Attorney in Texas proffered for her decision to jail a rape victim for nearly
a month on a material witness warrant, which included a claim that the
victim’s “life would have been at risk while homeless on the street.”103
Based in part on this paternalistic justification (though the woman was not
actually homeless), the state chose to detain her in a large and infamous
jail, where she was assaulted twice—once by an inmate and another time
by a guard.104 Furthermore, several participants in Thomas Kirsch II’s
qualitative study of responses to domestic violence victims who do not
want their abuser to be prosecuted also expressed paternalistic views.105
One such participant, a judge and former prosecutor in favor of forcing
victims to participate in domestic violence prosecutions, asserted that
“[e]ven though the victim may think she’ll be better off if the case is
dropped, I know that on so many other levels that that’s just not true.”106
These types of paternalistic positions purport that instrumentalizing GBV
victims in the prosecutorial process is necessary for their own good.
Like traditional forms of gender paternalism, which were justified by
100. Cf. id. at 1781–94, 1796 (explaining that women-protective justifications for abortion
restrictions rely upon antiquated notions of women’s decision-making capacities that are
“fundamentally at odds with the understanding of women’s dignity on which the modern
constitutional order rests”).
101. Id. at 1705 (discussing abortion restrictions, but I contend that this assertion also applies to
compelling GBV victims’ participation in the criminal legal process).
102. Rebecca McCray, Jailing the Victim, SLATE (July 12, 2017, 12:07 PM), http://slate.com/newsand-politics/2017/07/jailing-the-victim.html [https://perma.cc/5889-JK49].
103. Daniel Victor, Texas Rape Victim Was Jailed for Fear She Would Not Testify, Lawsuit Says,
N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/23/us/texas-rape-victim-was-jailedfor-fear-she-would-not-testify-lawsuit-says.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/8JSM-MP5Q].
104. See id.
105. Kirsch, supra note 65, at 399, 403, 418 (interviewing a small sample comprised of current and
former prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, and victim-witness advocates in Lake County,
Indiana).
106. Id. at 418.
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constructing women as “too weak to be entrusted with legal agency to act
autonomously” and therefore in need of protection from male coercion,107
measures to compel GBV victims’ participation are often similarly
justified with characterizations of victims as too weak, naïve, and lacking
in courage to resist male coercion.108 Offenders pressuring victims to drop
charges or refrain from assisting criminal legal authorities is a real issue
in the GBV context, but this conceptualization of victims lacks nuance
and “fails to account for any degree of victim volition, even in the face of
a[n] [offender’s] pressure.”109 It allows for a presumption of
involuntariness regarding victim decision-making110 and is used to justify
paternalistically taking the decision of whether to prosecute a particular
GBV offender, along with the victim’s participation in the prosecution,
“off the victim’s shoulders.”111 Yet, forcing a victim who is facing serious
threats from her abuser to testify puts her in a position in which she is
likely to conclude that committing perjury is her safest option, which
Linda Mills characterizes as “state-induced missocialization.”112
Paternalism also manifests in the conceptualization of arresting GBV
victims as “rescuing” them, which has become an increasingly common
justification for the practice among law enforcement, particularly with
respect to sex trafficking victims.113 Ohio Attorney General David Yost’s
107. Siegel, supra note 97, at 1777.
108. See, e.g., Donna Wills, Domestic Violence: The Case for Aggressive Prosecution, 7 UCLA
WOMEN’S L.J. 173, 177, 180 (1997) (arguing that “the great majority of domestic violence
victims[,] . . . after making the initial report, . . . have neither the will nor the courage to assist
prosecutors in holding the abusers criminally responsible” and “naively accept responsibility to stop
the batterer on their own”); see also Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency: Feminist
Perspectives on Self-Direction, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 842 (1999) (asserting that “observers
often miss [women’s exercise of resistant or partial agency] when it emerges because it does not
conform to their more confrontational expectations about what it means to resist oppression. This
misperception often has been costly for women, because when observers fail to see the response they
expect, they conclude that women are passive in the face of oppression. This leads many observers,
including some legal actors, to assume that women are either weak, wholly compromised figures who
can be treated paternalistically, or inadequately assertive individuals who should be compelled by the
use of legal incentives to defend their own rights”). Notably, paternalism towards GBV victims has
been championed by certain groups of feminists, who effectively advocated for mandatory criminal
legal interventions on “maternalistic” grounds—namely that they are necessary to protect abused
women from men’s coercive control and further abuse. See LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED
MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 123–24 (2012); Bennett Capers, On
“Violence Against Women”, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 347, 360 (2016).
109. Tamara L. Kuennen, Analyzing the Impact of Coercion on Domestic Violence Victims: How
Much Is Too Much?, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 2, 5 (2007).
110. See id. at 6.
111. See Wills, supra note 108, at 173.
112. Mills, supra note 22, at 593 (“In many cases, prosecutors force battered women to testify even
when the prosecutors know the battered women will lie.”).
113. See WU & YELDERMAN, supra note 30, at 22–23; Farrell et al., supra note 64, at 664.
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recent comments following the arrest of eight sex trafficking victims is a
clear example embodying this view.114 He characterized arresting human
trafficking victims as “often . . . the best way that law enforcement can
help.”115 He then explained his belief that doing so helps women “reset”
because they are offered services and “give[n] the opportunity to share
information that can help put their traffickers behind bars.”116 The Human
Trafficking Legal Center rightly criticizes “arrest-as-rescue” rhetoric on
the grounds that arrests are inherently hostile and coercive for victims.117
As Rachel Harmon observes, “[e]very arrest harms an individual, and
perhaps a community, no matter how lawful.”118 It is a “serious personal
intrusion,” invasion of the arrested individual’s privacy, and disruption of
her life.119 Once arrested, victims are under law enforcement control and
are more easily subjected to additional coercive practices, such as being
threatened with criminal charges or offered conditional assistance, aimed
at securing their participation in the investigation and prosecution of their
traffickers. An arrest can also cause long-term harm for survivors by
damaging their future employment prospects120 and making them too
fearful to disclose their current or future victimization to law
enforcement.121
In coercing GBV victims’ participation in the criminal legal process for
paternalistic reasons, state actors are substituting their own judgment
about what constitutes and serves particular victims’ best interests for that
of the victims themselves—hearkening back to the gender paternalism of
an earlier era.122 This begs two questions: (1) is the state truly a better
judge of victims’ “best interests” than victims themselves? and (2) does
coercing unwilling victims’ participation in the criminal legal process
114. See Corinne Moore, 8 Women Rescued and Arrested in Ohio Human Trafficking Single-Day
Sting, WANE.COM (Jan. 28, 2021), http://www.wane.com/news/national-world/8-women-rescuedand-arrested-in-central-ohio-human-trafficking-single-day-sting/ [https://perma.cc/AR6C-BBJK].
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See WU & YELDERMAN, supra note 30, at 22–23.
118. Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L REV. 761, 778 (2012). In a
qualitative study about New York’s Human Trafficking Intervention Courts (HTICs), stakeholders
underscored the traumatic impact of arrests upon presumptive trafficking victims whose cases were
heard in HTICs. Aya Gruber, Amy J. Cohen & Kate Mogulescu, Penal Welfare and the New Human
Trafficking Intervention Courts, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1333, 1393 & n.306 (2016).
119. William A. Schroeder, Warrantless Misdemeanor Arrests and the Fourth Amendment, 58 MO.
L. REV. 791, 797 n.67 (1993).
120. Farrell et al., supra note 64, at 668; see also JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL
RECORD 204–05 (2015) (noting that employers can easily access applicant arrest records through
commercial information vendors).
121. See Balgamwalla, supra note 22, at 203.
122. See Siegel, supra note 97.
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objectively leave them better off than they otherwise would be, in line
with the goals of paternalism?123
Regarding the first question, scholars have persuasively asserted that
individual GBV victims, rather than the state, are best positioned to decide
how to respond to violence in their lives.124 In the GBV context, victims
often know the perpetrator and can predict his future behavior and how he
will react to various interventions based on their familiarity with his
personality, tendencies, and past conduct.125 Moreover, it is victims
themselves who are most familiar with their own needs, interests, and
goals,126 and are therefore best placed to judge whether assisting
authorities with the investigation and prosecution of the offender is
consistent with them. This is supported by empirical research
demonstrating that, when making this judgment, GBV victims typically
engage in a complex decision-making process that involves weighing
multiple costs and benefits.127 And if they decide that participating is not
in their best interests, it is for rational reasons. For example, a common
reason is financial dependency upon the offender.128 If the victim assists
law enforcement and prosecutors, the defendant is much more likely to be
prosecuted and convicted, which results in lost wages and current
employment, as well as the barriers to future employment accompanying

123. The second question includes “objectively” to indicate that the costs and benefits of coercing
victims’ participation will be evaluated from the perspective of an “outsider” rather than from the
subjective perspective of the victim herself. This is necessary to explore whether assuming, arguendo,
that the state (as an “outsider”) is a better judge of victims’ bests interests than victims themselves,
coercing their unwilling participation leaves them better off than not doing so.
124. See Mills, supra note 22, at 555 & n.24; Jyoti Sanghera, Lessons from the Poetry of Departure,
Preface to GLOBAL ALLIANCE AGAINST TRAFFIC IN WOMEN (GAATW), COLLATERAL DAMAGE:
THE IMPACT OF ANTI-TRAFFICKING MEASURES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AROUND THE WORLD, at vii–viii
(2007); see also Laurie S. Kohn, The Justice System and Domestic Violence: Engaging the Case but
Divorcing the Victim, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 191, 229 & n.182 (2008).
125. See Kohn, supra note 124, at 229 n.182; Susan Brotherton & Jamie Manirakiza,
Understanding Sex Trafficking Through the Lens of Coercion: A Closer Look at Exploitation, Threats,
and Betrayal, in WORKING WITH THE HUMAN TRAFFICKING SURVIVOR: WHAT COUNSELORS,
PSYCHOLOGISTS, SOCIAL WORKERS AND MEDICAL PROFESSIONALS NEED TO KNOW 125, 133 (Mary
C. Burke ed., 2019).
126. See REBECCA SURTEES, INT’L CTR. FOR MIGRATION POL’Y DEV., LISTENING TO VICTIMS:
EXPERIENCES OF IDENTIFICATION, RETURN AND ASSISTANCE IN SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE 16 (2007).
127. See, e.g., Wechsler, supra note 12, at 1038–39 (finding that sex trafficking victims tend to
weigh multiple, complex factors when deciding whether to press charges and participate in the
criminal legal process); Rodney F. Kingsnorth & Randall C. Macintosh, Domestic Violence:
Predictors of Victim Support for Official Action, 21 JUST. Q. 301, 321–22 (2004) (finding that victims
of domestic violence “are engaged in a complex decision making process in which they seek to weigh
the costs and benefits of involving criminal justice system officials in their lives”).
128. Hare, supra note 85, at 614–16, 623; Nichols, supra note 12.
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a criminal record.129 Thus, it is rational that a victim who relies on the
offender for essential economic resources would not want to jeopardize
her access to them.
Another major reason many victims report for wanting to avoid the
process is distrust of or dissatisfaction with the criminal legal system.130
The research has confirmed the legitimacy of this concern. The very
nature of the criminal legal process has been identified as a source of stress
and discomfort for crime victims, particularly victims of GBV. Aspects
such as the need for victims to repeatedly and publicly recount traumatic
details of the crime, endure credibility challenges during crossexamination (and often from police when reporting the crime), and come
face-to-face with the offender in court typically pose considerable
difficulties for them.131 Especially within adversarial justice systems (as
opposed to inquisitorial systems), the “criminal trial has been criticised
for creating a hostile climate in which the victim feels used as a mere
witness to provide testimony that assists the court to reach a verdict.”132
In other words, the victim is negatively impacted by her role as a mere
instrument or tool of the system. In her article focusing on victims of
sexual and domestic violence, Judith Lewis Herman contends that “if one
set out intentionally to design a system for provoking symptoms of
traumatic stress, it might look very much like a court of law.”133
Participating in the criminal legal process is often difficult and retraumatizing even for victims who wholly desire it;134 but the level of
secondary trauma that victims who are forced to participate by the
coercive arm of the state experience is likely to be significantly greater.
Furthermore, secondary victimization of GBV victims by criminal
legal actors is prevalent.135 These actors often secondarily victimize GBV
victims through victim-blaming, disbelieving them or discounting their

129. See LEIGH GOODMARK, DECRIMINALIZING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A BALANCED POLICY
APPROACH TO INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 27 (2018).
130. Hare, supra note 85, at 613–16; LOVE ET AL., supra note 62, at 5–7.
131. See Judith Lewis Herman, Justice from the Victim’s Perspective, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN 571, 574 (2005); MARY ILIADIS, ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE AND VICTIMS’ RIGHTS:
RECONCEPTUALISING THE ROLE OF SEXUAL ASSAULT VICTIMS 33–34, 36, 38–41 (2020); Farrell et
al., supra note 8, at 159–60.
132. ILIADIS, supra note 131, at 38.
133. Herman, supra note 131, at 574.
134. OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, OFF. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, HUMAN TRAFFICKING TASK FORCE
E-GUIDE: STRENGTHENING COLLABORATIVE RESPONSES, USING A TRAUMA-INFORMED APPROACH,

http://www.ovcttac.gov/taskforceguide/eguide/4-supporting-victims/41-using-a-trauma-informedapproach/ [https://perma.cc/R9D8-SA6D]; see also Lara Bazelon & Bruce A. Green, Victims’ Rights
from a Restorative Perspective, 17 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 293, 294–97 (2020).
135. See supra note 15.
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credibility, trivializing the violence perpetrated against them, and
otherwise insensitively responding to their victimization.136 Social science
research has found that being secondarily victimized by criminal legal
authorities is associated with increased post-traumatic stress
symptomatology for victims of GBV.137 The likelihood and harms of
secondary victimization are often known to them from their previous
experiences and/or from stories shared with them by others in their
network.138 As a result, many GBV victims rationally decide against
cooperating with legal system actors.
The above examples show that there are logical reasons underlying
many GBV victims’ conclusions that the harms they would experience
from participating in the criminal legal process outweigh any benefits they
would gain from the censure and temporary incapacitation of the offender.
Given victims’ familiarity with their own situations, needs, and goals, and
their capacity for reasoned decision-making, there should be a strong
presumption in favor of their own determination of their best interests
over that of the state.
When the state attempts to override individual victims’ judgment
through the use of material witness warrants, contempt power, criminal
charges, conditional assistance, and similar measures, it causes them
serious harms (including the harms just discussed as rational reasons
underlying many victims’ desires to avoid the criminal legal process). The
extent of these harms undermines paternalistic justifications for these
tactics, which claim that their use will leave GBV victims better off than
they otherwise would be (the second question posed above). We must
examine the harms in-depth to fully appreciate why these tactics are
inconsistent with paternalism’s goals.
To start, forcing unwilling victims’ participation greatly impairs their
sense of agency within their lives, which can significantly disrupt and
impede their healing, according to neurobiology research.139 The
136. See Campbell, supra note 15, at 56, 61; Campbell & Raja, supra note 15, at 97, 102; FRANKLIN
ET AL., supra note 15, at 1. See generally Deborah Epstein & Lisa A. Goodman, Discounting Women:

Doubting Domestic Violence Survivors’ Credibility and Dismissing Their Experiences, 167 U. PA. L.
REV. 399 (2019).
137. Campbell & Raja, supra note 15, at 98, 103–04; see also Wemmers, supra note 14, at 226–29
(finding that crime victims (60% of study participants were female victims of violent crime) who felt
that they had been treated unfairly by criminal legal authorities experienced more frequent and severe
PTSD symptoms than those who felt that they had been treated fairly).
138. See Epstein & Goodman, supra note 136, at 452–53 (“Within many communities, these stories
[about legal system actors discrediting women] spread like wildfire.”). David A. Ford, Coercing
Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 18 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 669, 675
(2003).
139. See Elizabeth Osuch & Charles C. Engel, Research on the Treatment of Trauma Spectrum

Wechsler_Ready for Publication.docx (Do Not Delete)

2022]

VICTIMS AS INSTRUMENTS

6/21/22 10:47 AM

537

traumatic impact of experiencing GBV is well-documented,140 and thus
the importance of the healing process for victims cannot be overstated.
Furthermore, an in-depth study with eighty human trafficking survivors
revealed that a key part of how they defined “justice” was as “their ability
to ‘move on’ from their trafficking experiences, achieve autonomy, and
feel empowered by accomplishing self-defined goals.”141 These findings
strongly suggest that forcing victims to participate in the criminal legal
process against their will is incompatible with their sense of justice and
their expressed need to set and pursue their own ends in the aftermath of
their victimization.
In addition to impeding their healing from their primary victimization,
the highly coercive and instrumentalizing tactics described in Part I cause
significant secondary injury to GBV victims. Regarding material witness
warrants, contempt, and criminal charges, even just the threat of
imprisonment for a failure to testify is a “form of government-sanctioned
terrorizing” for GBV victims, which Linda Mills likens to the threats of
punishment for disobedience that many victims are subject to from their
abusers.142 When the state follows through with these threats, it further
mimics aspects of the abusive dynamic that often exists in intimate partner
violence and human trafficking situations, wherein the perpetrator
confines, isolates, and punishes the victim.143
Material witness warrants, contempt orders, and criminal charges
typically result in loss of GBV victims’ physical liberty, which is one of
the most profound injuries a person can experience.144 Detention literally
removes them from their lives—separating them from their loved ones,
communities, workplaces, and support networks. It harms their families
by preventing victims from fulfilling their caregiving responsibilities and
Responses: The Role of the Optimal Healing Environment and Neurobiology, 10 J. ALT. &
COMPLEMENTARY MED. S-211, S-215 (2004) (explaining the severe disruption to the neurobiology
underlying a person’s sense of agency during the course of a traumatic experience and asserting that
“[i]t is probable that restoring agency is critical in creating the feelings of control necessary for healing
in the individual”).
140. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
141. EVELYN MCCOY, COLLEEN OWENS, LILLY YU, HANNA LOVE & JEANETTE HUSSEMANN,
URB. INST., DELIVERING JUSTICE FOR HUMAN TRAFFICKING SURVIVORS: IMPLICATIONS FOR
PRACTICE
10
(2018),
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/97356/delivering
_justice_to_human_trafficking_survivors_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P2Q8-KB56]
(conducting
qualitative interviews with a 70% female sample of sex and/or labor trafficking survivors in eight
cities across the U.S.).
142. Mills, supra note 22, at 591.
143. See id. at 587, 591, 594; Balgamwalla, supra note 22, at 188–92, 197–200, 209–11.
144. See Allison Marston Danner & Adam Marcus Samaha, Judicial Oversight in Two Dimensions:
Charting Area and Intensity in the Decisions of Justice Stevens, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2051, 2078
(2006).
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interfering with their ability to provide financial support due to time away
from work and potential job loss.145 Detained victims and their families
also must deal with the stigma associated with arrest and incarceration.146
In addition to losing their physical liberty, they are often subjected to
harmful treatment from correctional officers and other inmates while they
are incarcerated.147 Examples include a rape victim who was attacked by
an inmate and punched in the face by a guard,148 and a domestic violence
victim who was “grabbed by both male and female guards, thrown down,
(sprayed [with a chemical agent]), had every ounce of clothing taken from
[her], even [her] glasses.”149
There are additional serious harms associated with victims being
criminally charged for the purpose of coercing their participation in the
prosecution of GBV offenders. At the outset, being arrested and charged
as a criminal can have negative psychological and emotional
consequences for GBV victims and severely impede their healing
process.150 If victims then agree to participate in the investigation and
prosecution of their abuser, they face potential re-traumatization from
having to recount distressing and sensitive details about their
victimization to the very authorities who treated them as criminals, and
also from having to testify about their victimization in an adversarial
setting in the presence of the perpetrator.151 Victims who refuse to
acquiesce in the face of charges are likely to be prosecuted,152 which
145. Joel Gunter, Why Are Crime Victims Being Jailed?, BBC NEWS (May 5, 2017),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-39662428 [https://perma.cc/E23Q-GEA3] (quoting New
Orleans ACLU spokesperson Colleen Kane Gielskie as stating, “Even a couple of days in jail can
destroy someone’s life. . . . It sets off a cascading effect, you can lose a job, lose custody of children,
all kinds of things that can have lasting consequences”); Stillman, supra note 30 (reporting the
concerns of a domestic violence victim jailed on a material witness warrant about being fired for
missing work and about her children’s well-being).
146. See Alex R. Piquero, David P. Farrington & Alfred Blumstein, The Criminal Career
Paradigm, 30 CRIME & JUST. 359, 402 (2003).
147. See Goodmark, Prosecutorial Misconduct, supra note 23, at 639.
148. Michaels, supra note 33.
149. Morabito, supra note 31.
150. See Mogulescu, supra note 63, at 479, 485 (“[N]o matter how sympathetic or sensitive the
court response may be, the mere existence of the criminal case and the experience of being arrested
and then prosecuted in criminal court is devastating for someone being trafficked and exploited.”);
Hersh, supra note 59, at 261 (asserting that “arrest re-victimizes and may re-traumatize” sex
trafficking victims); see also, e.g., Domestic Violence Victim Sent to Jail for Lying for Her Abuser,
supra note 67 (reporting that a domestic violence victim shared the following while in jail for perjury
because she covered up past beatings after receiving a death threat from her abuser: “I feel wrong. I
shouldn’t be here. I am the victim. I’m the victim”).
151. See supra notes 131–134 and accompanying text.
152. See Covey, supra note 21, at 875 (explaining that “prosecutors who threaten to bring perjury
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results in additional trauma and secondary victimization.153 If convicted,
they must then endure the pains of incarceration for what can be lengthy
periods—particularly in the case of “bottoms” convicted for sex
trafficking offenses.154 Even those who accept plea deals including an
agreement to testify against their abuser may serve time, and in the case
of deals related to sex crime charges, they are usually required to register
as sex offenders—resulting in stigma, expense, and other harms.155
Whether they accept a plea deal or are convicted, they will be plagued
with a criminal record, which is often a barrier to accessing many types
of housing, employment, immigration status, and other opportunities.156
Accordingly, the practice of charging or threatening charges against GBV
victims with the aim of securing their cooperation causes significant harm,
regardless of whether they acquiesce to governmental actors’ wishes.
There are also considerable harms that result from conditioning
assistance upon cooperation with criminal legal actors for the many GBV
victims who cannot otherwise access much-needed resources. If they
decide that cooperating is not in their best interests or if they are unable
to fully cooperate due to trauma, a serious safety threat or another issue,
they are denied key assistance that would otherwise be available to
them.157 The consequences can be severe. For those GBV victims who are
un- or under-insured and cannot access CVCPs, medical treatment for
injuries resulting from their victimization can be financially

charges must, to preserve their credibility, at least sometimes carry out the threat”); Crocker, supra
note 52, at 780–82 (discussing the prosecution of “bottoms” who choose not to cooperate with
prosecutors and testify against their traffickers).
153. See Mogulescu, supra note 63, at 479, 485.
154. See Crocker, supra note 52, at 780–83; see also, e.g., Morgan Smith, Edgar Walters & Neena
Satija, She Was a Sex-Trafficking Victim, but Texas Law Labeled Her a Pimp, TEX. TRIB. (Feb. 16,
2017, 12:00 AM), http://www.texastribune.org/2017/02/16/she-was-sex-trafficking-victim-texaslaw-labeled-her-pimp/ [https://perma.cc/YL5J-VSUA] (describing the case of a “bottom” who “froze
up” due to fear when it was time for her to testify against her trafficker, and as a result was unable to
receive a reduced sentence as part of a plea deal that required her testimony; she was then convicted
for trafficking a minor and sentenced to fifteen years in prison for this offense).
155. See, e.g., LAURA T. MURPHY, SURVIVORS OF SLAVERY: MODERN DAY SLAVE NARRATIVES
52 (2014) (describing the experience of a sex trafficking victim who spent three weeks in prison and
accepted a plea deal requiring her to register as a sex offender after being charged with transporting
minors across state lines for illegal purposes); Robert McClendon, ‘Saved’ from Her Life on the
Streets, Only to Be Branded ‘Sex Offender’, NOLA.COM (July 19, 2019, 9:33 AM),
http://www.nola.com/news/crime_police/article_8ee1b60c-df93-5549-be92-5e1896f10c35.html
[https://perma.cc/B7CU-L83T] (reporting the detrimental impact of having to register as a sex
offender upon a sex trafficking victim’s life, which was part of a plea deal she had accepted after
spending two months in prison).
156. See Mogulescu, supra note 63, at 479, 483.
157. See supra section I.C.
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devastating.158 Empirical research has demonstrated that female GBV
victims’ annual health care costs are significantly higher than those of
women who have not experienced GBV.159 Furthermore, lost wages from
missed work due to GBV victimization are also common, which research
has shown has a considerable negative impact upon victims’ income
levels.160 For undocumented GBV victims who cannot access a U.S. visa
because they do not wish to or are unable to cooperate with law
enforcement, or who cooperate but the relevant authorities refuse to sign
the required certification, the harms are serious and far-reaching.161 They
must contend with the continued harms of living in the U.S. without legal
immigration status, including the enduring fear of detention and
deportation, which often curtails their participation in community and
social life.162 They remain barred from accessing potentially lifesustaining federal public benefits, such as the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families,
Supplemental Security Income, regular (non-emergency) Medicaid, and
health care subsidies under the Affordable Care Act.163 If undocumented
victims end up being detained and/or deported, they face the harms of
family and community separation, in addition to potential poverty,
unemployment, homelessness, and other harsh conditions that may have
driven them to immigrate in the first place.164 Detention and deportation
also carry serious collateral consequences for detained and deported
individuals’ families and communities left behind—including
psychological trauma, loss of income and caregiving, adolescents abruptly
needing to fill adult roles, and an uncertain future.165
GBV victims who fail to be identified as such because they do not fit
into stereotypes of “real” victims (who are constructed as fully
158. See MCLEAN & BOCINSKI, supra note 82, at 1–2.
159. Amy E. Bonomi, Melissa L. Anderson, Frederick P. Rivara & Robert S. Thompson, Health
Care Utilization and Costs Associated with Physical and Nonphysical-Only Intimate Partner
Violence, 44 HEALTH SERVS. RSCH. 1052, 1062–64 (2009).
160. MCLEAN & BOCINSKI, supra note 82, at 3.
161. This also applies to human trafficking victims who do not fit the age or trauma exceptions to
the cooperation requirement for a T visa.
162. Angélica Cházaro, Beyond Respectability: Dismantling the Harms of “Illegality”, 52 HARV.
J. LEGIS. 355, 355–56, 361 (2015); Raymond Michalowski & Lisa Hardy, Victimizing the
Undocumented: Immigration Policy and Border Enforcement as State Crime, in TOWARDS A
VICTIMOLOGY OF STATE CRIME 87, 99–101 (Dawn L. Rothe & David Kauzlarich eds., 2014).
163. NAT’L IMMIGR, FACT SHEET: IMMIGRANTS AND PUBLIC BENEFITS 1 (2018),
http://immigrationforum.org/article/fact-sheet-immigrants-and-public-benefits/
[https://perma.cc/
5M3U-QRXY].
164. See Cházaro, supra note 162, at 362.
165. Tanya Golash-Boza, Punishment Beyond the Deportee: The Collateral Consequences of
Deportation, 63 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1331, 1333–45 (2019).
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cooperative with law enforcement)166 are likely to be deprived of referrals
to service providers that could assist them with exiting their abusive
situation and provide them with the support and resources they need for
recovery. Even worse, GBV victims who are not given legitimate victim
status could be forced to endure the criminal legal process “marked as
defendants” for prostitution or other illegal activity related to their
victimization.167 If the practice of conditioning assistance upon
cooperation effectively coerces them into cooperating against their will,
they are then likely to experience the harms associated with an
undermined sense of agency, GBV victims’ participation in the criminal
legal process, and potential (further) secondary victimization.168
Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the practices described in
Part I result in significant harms for GBV victims. In light of the capacity
of adult GBV survivors to make rational decisions about their lives and
their familiarity with their personal situations, needs, priorities, and goals,
we can conclude that they are better placed than the state to determine
whether participating in the criminal legal process is in their best interests.
But even setting this notion aside, an objective view of the costs and
benefits of these tactics rebuts claims that their use leaves victims better
off than they otherwise would be. Employing criminal law measures
against certain offenders may temporarily make their victims safer from
GBV perpetrated by those offenders (though the empirical research
discussed in the next section indicates that these cases are far less common
than most people think). But given the serious and myriad harms that
coercive and instrumentalizing tactics aimed at compelling victims’
participation cause, this potential benefit cannot effectively justify their
use on paternalistic grounds because they fail to serve paternalism’s goals.
In reality, these practices cause GBV victims more harm than good—
thereby undercutting the paternalistic justifications advanced by those
who defend their past and continued use.
B.

Utilitarianism

Many of the justifications advanced for instrumentalizing and coercing
GBV victims within the criminal legal process can be characterized as
utilitarian because they focus on overall benefit to the social welfare.169
Utilitarianism is a form of consequentialist ethics because it judges the

166. See supra note 26.
167. See Mogulescu, supra note 63, at 481.
168. See supra notes 130–135, 138.
169. See NIGEL WARBURTON, PHILOSOPHY: THE BASICS 47 (5th ed. 2012).
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morality of an action on the basis of its consequences.170 Those who
defend the use of the practices detailed in Part I by putting forward these
types of justifications argue that they result in a greater amount of
collective benefit than harm, and are thus the morally “right” course of
action. They tend to rely on the assumption that criminal legal responses
are necessary in most, if not all, cases of GBV in order to effectively
address GBV within our society.
Defenders of forcing victims to cooperate cite the fact that GBV
negatively affects others beyond the direct victims. Kirsch’s study found
that some interviewees justified coerced cooperation with concerns about
victims’ children, future victims, responding police officers, prosecutors’
offices (which may be blamed for future incidents if they drop charges),
and/or the wider community.171 One of the prosecutors interviewed
explained his position as follows:
I would have had no problem putting a victim in jail because she
refused to cooperate. I have a legal obligation to the people of this
state to prosecute crimes of this nature. To me, these are serious
offenses that affect other people in the community. If he’s beating
her up, it’s not too long before he’s beating up the kids. I have to
do what I can to stop the abuse and I think prosecution is the best
way.172
Likewise, former New Orleans District Attorney Leon Cannizzaro
defended his office’s practice of arresting rape and domestic violence
victims on material witness warrants by appealing to the greater good.173
He asked, “[i]s it more important for this witness to be inconvenienced for
a very short period of time or is it better for the community to get the
violent offender off the streets and keep him off the streets?”174 Similarly,
170. Id. at 46–47.
171. Kirsch, supra note 65, at 387, 400, 403, 416, 421–23.
172. Id. at 402–03.
173. Pishko, supra note 85. Cannizzaro was so determined to force victims to cooperate in
prosecutions that his office regularly served them with fake subpoenas ordering them to appear at his
office for questioning and threatening fines and imprisonment if they failed to comply. See Charles
Maldonado, Orleans Parish Prosecutors Are Using Fake Subpoenas to Pressure Witnesses to Talk to
Them, LENS (Apr. 26, 2017), http://thelensnola.org/2017/04/26/orleans-parish-prosecutors-are-usingfake-subpoenas-to-pressure-witnesses-to-talk-to-them/ [https://perma.cc/XH37-QN8T]. Victims,
witnesses, and a non-profit organization sued Cannizzaro and his ADAs in 2017 for this practice and
for their deceptive applications for material witness warrants. Complaint & Jury Demand, Singleton
v. Cannizzarro, 397 F. Supp. 3d 840 (E.D. La. 2017) (No. 2:17-cv-10721-JTM-JVM), 2017 WL
11647620. The parties settled in October 2021. Kevin McGill, Settlement Ends Lawsuit over Fake
Subpoenas, Jailed Victims, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 5, 2021), http://apnews.com/article/neworleans-subpoenas-lawsuits-crime-courts-1ccf1b85a57d7f6b7b791fa602ad9c1c (last visited Apr. 3,
2022).
174. Pishko, supra note 85.
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Maine District Attorney Maeghan Maloney asserted that “[t]he reason [for
arresting victims] is the prosecution is not just for her but for the
community. With domestic violence, she’s not likely to be his one and
only victim.”175
Proponents of forced victim participation practices also argue that they
send the message to GBV offenders that they cannot escape criminal
accountability by pressuring their victims not to testify.176 They contend
that without this message, the criminal legal system would lose credibility
with abusers.177 Consequently, defendants would have little incentive to
enter into plea agreements if they knew that the state would not force their
victims to cooperate.178 In addition, proponents assert that the state needs
to send the message to society as a whole that GBV is wrong by
aggressively prosecuting it, even when doing so necessitates coercing
victims’ participation.179
One particularly strong proponent of mandating GBV victim
participation was the late law professor and former prosecutor Cheryl
Hanna. She strongly believed that any costs of forcing victims to
participate in the criminal legal process are justified by overall benefits to
society.180 Hanna viewed punishing the offender in order to protect
potential victims as the goal of the criminal legal system within the
domestic violence context.181 Accordingly, she made the utilitarian
argument that “prosecutors must consistently mandate participation [for
victims of domestic violence], including testimony at trial, when
necessary to proceed with a case. The societal benefits gained through this
criminal justice response to domestic violence far outweigh any shortterm costs to women’s autonomy and collective safety.”182 Despite good
intentions, Hanna’s position plainly constructs victims of GBV as
sacrificial objects: no matter the harms to individual victims, they should
be reduced to evidentiary tools against their will. She viewed this as
necessary to “condemn and control violence against women.”183
Those in favor of coercing GBV victims to participate in the criminal
175. Id.
176. See Gwinn & O’Dell, supra note 30, at 313; Hanna, supra note 41, at 1890; Kirsch, supra
note 65, at 419.
177. Gwinn & O’Dell, supra note 30, at 313; Hanna, supra note 41, at 1891.
178. See Hanna, supra note 41, at 1892; Kirsch, supra note 65, at 424.
179. Hanna, supra note 41, at 1889–90; see also Gwinn & O’Dell, supra note 30, at 305, 313–14;
Morabito, supra note 31.
180. See generally Hanna, supra note 41.
181. Id. at 1870.
182. Id. at 1857.
183. Id. at 1909.

Wechsler (Do Not Delete)

544

6/21/22 10:47 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:507

legal process often deny, minimize, or underestimate the severity of the
harms involved. For example, Hanna contended that the “danger [of
revictimization] is often exaggerated.”184 She also referred only to “shortterm costs” of compelling victim participation and overlooked the longterm harms to victims, their families, and their communities.185 As
indicated above, Cannizzaro characterized arrest and detention on
material witness warrants as an “inconvenience[] for a very short period
of time.”186 This is quite an understatement, given the often serious and
long-lasting harms this practice causes to GBV victims and their loved
ones.187 Some proponents of forced participation explicitly deny that it
revictimizes GBV victims at all.188 This view has been clearly debunked
by the literature on secondary victimization and real-life examples.189
There is disagreement over whether it is likely that curbing the
practices that coerce and instrumentalize victims within the criminal legal
process would thwart some GBV prosecutions.190 Even if it does, there
will undoubtedly still be GBV prosecutions and convictions, as victims
often choose to participate in the criminal legal process for reasons
unrelated to state coercion, including retribution, deterrence, and
incapacitation.191 But before we can draw conclusions about the
implications of potentially decreased prosecutions, we must ask: does
instrumentalizing GBV victims within the criminal legal process actually
result in a net benefit to society, in line with what the utilitarian approach
demands? The aim of doing so is to achieve more prosecutions and
convictions for GBV crimes. However, scholars, advocates, journalists,

184. Id. at 1894.
185. See id. at 1857. Long-term harms of utilizing highly coercive tactics to compel GBV victim
participation are discussed below in this section and supra section II.A.
186. See Pishko, supra note 85.
187. See supra notes 131–139, 142–168 and accompanying text; infra notes 214–215, 217 and
accompanying text.
188. E.g., Kirsch, supra note 65, at 415; Morabito, supra note 31.
189. See supra notes 47–50, 94, 131–139, 150, 154–155 and accompanying text; infra notes 207–
08 and accompanying text.
190. Compare, e.g., WU & YELDERMAN, supra note 30, at 2 (contending that eliminating the
practice of arresting and jailing of human trafficking victims on material witness warrants would
“undoubtedly thwart some prosecutions”), with Goodmark, Prosecutorial Misconduct, supra note 23,
at 655 (“Research suggests that prosecutors could forgo the use of material witness warrants with
little impact on prosecutorial effectiveness.” (citing Robert C. Davis, Chris S. O’Sullivan & Donald
J. Farole, Jr., A Comparison of Two Prosecution Policies in Cases of Intimate Partner Violence:
Mandatory Case Filing Versus Following the Victim’s Lead, 7 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 633
(2008))).
191. See Hare, supra note 85, at 615–16, 624–25; Wechsler, supra note 12, at 1046–49, 1054–58,
1066–70, 1074–77. Even Cheryl Hanna acknowledged that some women “zealously want to
cooperate in the prosecution of their batterer.” Hanna, supra note 41, at 1884.
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and survivors are increasingly challenging the wisdom of foregrounding
prosecutorial responses to GBV, especially as the Black Lives Matter and
Defund the Police movements shine a light on the disproportionately
negative impact of these interventions upon low-income communities of
color and other marginalized groups.192
Scholars have highlighted the role of effective advocacy for increased
criminal law responses to GBV in contributing to the mass incarceration
problem in the U.S.193 The socially and economically marginalized
communities targeted with hyper-incarceration of its members experience
weakened social ties and internal social controls, eroded community
infrastructure, reduced civic participation, and depressed economic
activity, resources, and opportunity as a consequence.194 These conditions
operate to increase the likelihood of violence, including GBV.195 This
serious harm must be accounted for when assessing the overall impact of
increased prosecutions and convictions for GBV offenses upon society, as
achieved through the instrumentalization of victims within the criminal
legal process.
Along these lines, traditional criminal law responses fail to address, and
often exacerbate, the underlying drivers of GBV.196 The prioritization of
192. E.g., Sabra Boyd, The Police Are Not Our Allies in the Fight Against Trafficking, MEDIUM
(Aug.
13,
2020),
http://sabra-boyd.medium.com/the-police-are-not-our-allies-5f4e9fc4f425
[https://perma.cc/H32D-3LV5]; GOODMARK, supra note 129; AYA GRUBER, THE FEMINIST WAR ON
CRIME: THE UNEXPECTED ROLE OF WOMEN’S LIBERATION IN MASS INCARCERATION (2020); Aya
Gruber, How Police Became the Go-to Response to Domestic Violence, SLATE (July 7, 2020, 4:03
PM),
http://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/07/policing-domestic-violence-history.html
[https://perma.cc/24JH-LJ83]; Pishko, supra note 85; Deborah M. Weissman, The Community
Politics of Domestic Violence, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 1479 (2017); Wilson Wong, ‘Defund the Police’
Movement Could Offer Sexual Assault Survivors a Different Path for Justice, Experts Say, NBC NEWS
(Aug. 2, 2020), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/defund-police-movement-could-offersexual-assault-survivors-different-path-n1235478 [https://perma.cc/HVX5-ALPF].
193. E.g., GRUBER, supra note 192; BETH RICHIE, BLACK WOMEN, VIOLENCE, AND AMERICA’S
PRISON NATION 78–83, 159, 162–63 (2012); GOODMARK, supra note 129, at 3–4, 13–15.
194. See Coker & Macquoid, supra note 7, at 607–09; GOODMARK, supra note 129, at 27–28, 31–
32; RICHIE, supra note 193, at 96; MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 94–96, 103, 123–26, 180, 184–91 (rev. ed. 2012);
Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American
Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1281–97 (2004). “[I]nformal social controls” within a
community refer to the largely informal networks among community members which enforce social
and behavioral norms, including those impacting public safety. See Roberts, supra, at 1285–87. See
generally Todd R. Clear, The Problem with ‘Addition by Subtraction’: The Prison-Crime Relationship
in Low-Income Communities, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS
IMPRISONMENT 181 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002).
195. See Coker & Macquoid supra note 7, at 610–14; GOODMARK, supra note 129, at 28;
ALEXANDER, supra note 194, at 237; Roberts, supra note 194, at 1286–88, 1297.
196. See Chuang, supra note 6, at 1725–26; GOODMARK, supra note 129, at 8, 26–29, 47–74;
Deborah M. Weissman, Gender Violence, the Carceral State, and the Politics of Solidarity, 55 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 801 (2021).
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arrests, prosecutions, and convictions has led to the concentration of
resources in carceral interventions and significantly fewer resources being
invested in tackling the root causes of this social problem.197 Structural
determinants of GBV include high unemployment rates,198 low income
levels,199 cultures of hypermasculinity,200 prevalent alcohol abuse,201 and
high levels of social disorganization.202 These are often amplified by
criminal legal interventions. For example, the economic risk factors are
exacerbated by missed work, lost wages, and lost jobs resulting from
arrests, prosecutions, and incarceration (even short-term), as well as by
hiring discrimination against job candidates with a criminal record.203
Furthermore, far from serving as “legitimate ‘therapy’ to persuade the
abuser to reconsider before resorting to violence,” as prosecutor Donna
Wills claims,204 prisons feature a widespread culture of “destructive
masculinity,” which fuels and reinforces the hypermasculine attitudes
often associated with GBV perpetration.205 And communities where a
high proportion of members are incarcerated suffer from increased social
disorganization as a consequence.206 Thus, the myopic concentration of
resources in criminal legal responses to GBV not only comes at the
expense of mitigating well-established risk factors for GBV, but also
197. See Coker, supra note 7, at 155; GOODMARK, supra note 129, at 5, 28.
198. Kirsten Beyer, Anne Baber Wallis & L. Kevin Hamberger, Neighborhood Environment and
Intimate Partner Violence: A Systematic Review, 16 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 16, 40 (2015);
Deborah M. Capaldi, Naomi B. Knoble, Joann Wu Shortt & Hyoun K. Kim, A Systematic Review of
Risk Factors for Intimate Partner Violence, 3 PARTNER ABUSE 231, 242–43 (2012).
199. Beyer et al., supra note 198; Capaldi et al., supra note 198; see also Chuang, supra note 6, at
1724–26.
200. Catalina Vechiu, The Role of Hypermasculinuty as a Risk Factor in Sexual Assault
Perpetration, in HANDBOOK OF SEXUAL ASSAULT AND SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION 257, 257–63
(William T. O’Donohue & Paul A. Schewe eds., 2019).
201. See GOODMARK, supra note 129, at 70; Carrie A. Moylan & McKenzie Javorka, Widening the
Lens: An Ecological Review of Campus Sexual Assault, 21 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 179, 182
(2020).
202. Beyer et al., supra note 198 (identifying lower levels of collective efficacy, stronger norms of
nonintervention, and higher perceived neighborhood disorder as “direct measures of social
disorganization” that are associated with increased IPV rates).
203. See ALEXANDER, supra note 194, at 152; GOODMARK, supra note 129, at 27–28; Eisha Jain,
Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 821–25, 839–41 (2015); Roberts, supra note 194, at
1293–94.
204. Wills, supra note 108, at 181.
205. Angela P. Harris, Heteropatriarchy Kills: Challenging Gender Violence in a Prison Nation,
37 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 13, 27–32 (2011); see SpearIt, Gender Violence in Prison & Hypermasculinities in the ‘Hood: Cycles of Destructive Masculinity, 37 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 89, 97, 106,
131–33 (2011).
206. Roberts, supra note 194, at 1285–87 (asserting that mass incarceration leads to “[d]isorganized
communities [that] cannot enforce social norms” and likely reduces residents’ collective efficacy by
weakening social networks).
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amplifies many of these factors.
In light of these serious costs, the prioritization of criminal law
responses to GBV would need to yield very large benefits for it to be
justifiable under a utilitarian perspective. But existing research fails to
demonstrate sizeable benefits, and alarmingly, provides evidence of
additional significant harms. Most of the empirical research on the impact
of criminal law interventions for GBV focuses on domestic violence or
intimate partner violence (IPV), a major type of GBV.207 For example, the
famed Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment and its five
replication studies in different cities examined the effects of arrest (versus
other police actions, which varied across experiments) on domestic
violence recidivism.208 The results are mixed and complex. In the Omaha,
Charlotte, and Milwaukee replication experiments, there is evidence that
arrest initially deterred IPV reoffending but was associated with increased
reoffending over a longer time period.209 A reanalysis of the original
Minneapolis experiment data showed an overall deterrent effect of arrest
that decayed over time and disappeared at six months based upon victim
interview data, a trend suggesting possible long-term IPV escalation

207. Both IPV and domestic violence are used to refer to violence by one romantic partner against
another. The latter term is broader than the former and is also used to describe violence by a family
member against another family member related by blood or adoption. See GOODMARK, supra note
129, at 157 n.1. However, IPV and domestic violence “are terms that are often used interchangeably
in reference to IPV.” Briana Barocas, Hila Avieli & Rei Shimizu, Restorative Justice Approaches to
Intimate Partner Violence: A Review of Interventions, 11 PARTNER ABUSE 318, 325 (2020).
208. The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment received a great deal of popular media
attention, including from the N.Y. Times, Associated Press, CBS News, and ABC Nightline. See
Lawrence Sherman, Joel Garner, Ellen Cohn & Edwin Hamilton, The Impact of Research on Police
Practices: A Case Study of the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment, in 1 NAT’L CONF. ON
DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE
145,
160–62
(Suzanne
E.
Hatty
ed.,
1986),
https://www.aic.gov.au/sites/default/files/2021-04/aic-seminar-proceedings-12_vol1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DZL3-37BU]; Richard Lempert, From the Editor, 18 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 505, 506
(1984). It had a tremendous impact on public policy, prompting many jurisdictions to adopt
mandatory arrest and other pro-arrest policies for domestic violence incidents. Notably, some scholars
sharply criticized the researchers who had conducted the experiment for their extensive efforts to
publicize the results. See, e.g., Arnold Binder & James W. Meeker, Implications of the Failure to
Replicate the Minneapolis Experimental Findings, 58 AM. SOC. REV. 886, 887 (1992) (“Sherman and
his various associates actively promoted the results of this study in a variety of nonacademic media,
and the promotion implied advocacy of policy. The consequence was a dramatic change in public
policy with potentially substantial negative effects on many people and an unwarranted large
expenditure of public monies.”); Lempert, supra, at 509 (positing “that the results of this research
have been prematurely and unduly publicized, and that police departments that have changed their
arrest practices in response to this research may have adopted an innovation that does more harm than
good.”).
209. LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN, JANELL D. SCHMIDT & DENNIS P. ROGAN, POLICING DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE: EXPERIMENTS AND DILEMMAS 17 (1992).
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effects as well.210 The Colorado Springs and Miami replication
experiments found deterrent effects from arrest and no escalation
effects.211 Notably, there is compelling evidence that the impact of arrest
varied based upon suspects’ employment status: the Milwaukee, Colorado
Springs, and Omaha data indicate that unemployed suspects’ reoffending
increased following arrest, while that of employed suspects did not.212
This finding strongly suggests that communities with high unemployment
rates experience increased domestic violence when police frequently use
arrest as a response to domestic violence incidents.213
Serious harmful consequences of carceral interventions for domestic
violence, particularly for people of color, have been confirmed by
longitudinal research conducted twenty-three years after the original
Minneapolis experiment, examining the very same sample.214 The
researchers discovered that 64% more victims whose partners had been
arrested and jailed had died than those whose partners had only been
warned.215 This finding was much more pronounced for Black victims
than it was for White216 victims: 98% more Black victims had died, while
9% more White victims had died.217 As most study participant deaths had
been caused by heart disease and other internal morbidities rather than
homicide, the researchers hypothesize that the higher likelihood of death
among victims whose partners had been arrested is linked to the trauma
of witnessing the arrest, mediated by employment status and other social
210. Id. at 197. Victim interview data can provide a more accurate picture of IPV reoffending
because it encompasses IPV incidents that are not reported to police. However, low participation in
follow-up interviews can also skew data. For the Minneapolis experiment, only 49% of victims
completed all twelve follow-up interviews, which may have impacted the findings regarding
recidivism over the course of the six-month study period. Id. at 275; Stephen J. Schulhofer, The
Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 2151, 2162–63 n.43, 2163 n.46 (1995).
211. See SHERMAN ET AL., supra note 209, at 17.
212. Id. at 17, 126–27, 174–77, 182–85 (analyzing the employment status variable for only the
Milwaukee, Colorado Springs, and Omaha studies due to lack of availability or problems with the
data from the other studies, and hypothesizing that the role of this variable was linked to suspects’
“stakes in conformity,” or how much they stand to lose as a consequence of being arrested).
213. See id. at 22.
214. Lawrence W. Sherman & Heather M. Harris, Increased Death Rates of Domestic Violence
Victims from Arresting vs. Warning Suspects in the Milwaukee Domestic Violence Experiment
(MilDVE), 11 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 1, 6 (2015).
215. Id. (finding that this difference was statistically significant).
216. I have chosen to capitalize “White” to highlight that all races are socially constructed
categories, “White” should not be viewed as the neutral standard, White people are no more culturally
diverse than people of other races, and to remove power from racists’ norm-defying capitalization of
White by contributing to a change in the norm. See Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Case for
Capitalizing the B in Black, ATLANTIC (June 18, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/
ideas/archive/2020/06/time-to-capitalize-blackand-white/613159/ [https://perma.cc/8LUX-79VU].
217. Sherman & Harris, supra note 214, at 9.
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contextual factors.218
Regarding the ability of carceral responses to GBV to deter
reoffending, which is often cited as a reason to continue prioritizing these
interventions, the abundance of studies on the topic with complex and
often seemingly contradictory findings renders meta-analyses especially
useful and important. Meta-analysis is a methodology that systematically
and quantitatively synthesizes the results from multiple empirical studies
examining a particular research question in order to draw well-grounded
conclusions from the combined data.219 Fortunately, there is a recent,
rigorous meta-analysis of fifty-seven studies examining the effects of
post-arrest sanctions upon IPV recidivism to help us make sense of the
abundance of research on this topic.220 The large number of studies
included should give us a high degree of confidence in the results, since
“the more inclusive and larger the body of prior studies considered [in a
meta-analysis], the stronger and more reliable the conclusions can be.”221
This meta-analysis found that prosecuting offenders had only a marginal
deterrent effect, convicting them had no impact upon their future IPV
offending, and incarcerating them had a large escalation effect—meaning
that those who were incarcerated for IPV were significantly more likely
to commit IPV again as compared with those who were not
incarcerated.222 These findings are compelling and refute the position that
coercing and instrumentalizing victims to enable the conviction and
incarceration of IPV offenders is necessary to reduce GBV and produces
a net benefit to society. Since prosecuting IPV only marginally deters
reoffending, the overall deterrence benefits of broadly prioritizing
prosecution, including when victims do not wish to participate in the
criminal legal process, very likely do not outweigh the overall costs of
doing so.
In addition to marginal deterrence of reoffending through prosecutions,
a utilitarian analysis must account for other benefits of criminal legal
responses to IPV, and GBV more generally. One benefit is the expressive
218. Id. at 7, 14–17.
219. Edward Wells, Uses of Meta-Analysis in Criminal Justice Research: A Quantitative Review,
26 JUST. Q. 268, 270–71, 291 (2009). While descriptive surveys of existing studies are certainly
useful, meta-analyses yield more valid and informative results on which to base policy decisions
because they avoid the former’s subjectivity, ambiguity, and the great difficulty of drawing
conclusions about and comparing individual studies with weak detected effects, limited samples,
statistical errors, and/or the fallible measurements common in real-world research. Id. at 268–71, 291.
220. Joel H. Garner, Christopher D. Maxwell & Jina Lee, The Specific Deterrent Effects of
Criminal Sanctions for Intimate Partner Violence: A Meta-Analysis, 111 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
227 (2021).
221. Id. at 271.
222. Garner et al., supra note 220, at 227, 255–59.
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value of enforcing criminal laws against those who commit GBV—it
communicates to both offenders and to wider society that GBV is morally
wrong and will not be tolerated.223 Yet, there are other ways to achieve
this benefit without relying on traditional criminal law mechanisms, such
as through community-based justice forums and well-developed
educational interventions.224 Another benefit is potentially increased
safety for both victims and others through the incapacitation of certain
offenders pending trial and/or through sentencing.225 However, in the IPV
context at least, this temporary reduction in violence is most likely
negated and even outweighed by the future escalation of IPV associated
with incarceration.226
As GBV victims are members of society, we also must account for the
impact of aggressively coercing their participation in the criminal legal
process upon them227 when analyzing whether doing so results in a net
benefit or net cost to society. In addition, it is important to recognize that
the harms of secondary victimization and re-traumatization stretch beyond
the victim herself, to her partner, family members, friends, and others in
her support network and community. Just as primary victimization
typically has a “ripple effect,” resulting in emotional trauma for those who
care about the crime victim, secondary victimization often imposes harms
upon these individuals as well.228 This is primarily because their recovery
is closely tied to the victim’s healing process.229 Secondary victimization
can also harm professionals who work with victims, such as social
workers, therapists, and lawyers, by leading to their “vicarious
traumatization” from hearing victims describe the troubling treatment
223. See GOODMARK, supra note 129, at 30–31; Hanna, supra note 41, at 1889–90.
224. See, e.g., Leigh Goodmark, “Law and Justice Are Not Always the Same”: Creating
Community-Based Justice Forums for People Subjected to Intimate Partner Abuse, 42 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 707, 736–38, 744–47 (2015) (asserting that community-based justice forums for IPV survivors
would allow the wider community to acknowledge the wrong of IPV, publicly shame the offender,
and send a message that survivors’ suffering matters); Kristie A. Thomas, Susan B. Sorenson &
Manisha Joshi, “Consent Is Good, Joyous, Sexy”: A Banner Campaign to Market Consent to College
Students, 64 J. AM. COLL. HEALTH 639, 645 (2016) (finding that a sexual assault prevention campaign
on a college campus featuring colorful banners with messages about consent (e.g., “Consent can be
Revoked”) effectively communicated the message that sexual assault is wrong).
225. See GOODMARK, supra note 129, at 30.
226. See Garner et al., supra note 220, at 227, 258–59.
227. See supra section II.A.
228. Diane M. Daane, The Ripple Effect: Secondary Sexual Assault Survivors, in SEXUAL
ASSAULT: THE VICTIMS, THE PERPETRATORS, AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 113, 113–14, 117
(Frances P. Reddington & Betsy Wright Krisel eds., 2005) (explaining that it is common for sexual
assault victims to experience setbacks in their healing process, especially during their involvement
with the criminal legal system, and that these setbacks also disrupt the recovery of those close to the
victim).
229. Id. at 117.
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they experienced at the hands of criminal legal authorities.230 Finally, a
victim’s secondary victimization can impact her wider community by
discouraging other victims from seeking help, out of fear of being
secondarily victimized themselves.231
Even recognizing the challenge of weighing costs and benefits in
utilitarian analysis due to issues of incommensurability,232 the foregoing
examination makes clear that the costs of coercing and instrumentalizing
GBV victims in the criminal legal process against their will outweigh the
benefits of doing so to society as a whole. Not only do the contested
practices result in great harms, but the primary utilitarian justification for
employing them—that they lead to reduced GBV rates in society—has
been refuted by rigorous empirical research. Thus, we can conclude that,
like the paternalistic justifications advanced by defenders of these
practices, their utilitarian justifications do not hold water. From a
utilitarian perspective, the highly coercive and instrumentalizing practices
described in Part I are, in fact, morally objectionable.
III. OVERLOOKED CONCEPTUAL FRAMES
Discussions around the state’s use of coercive and instrumentalizing
practices on GBV victims have overlooked three interrelated
conceptualizations of the issue that are rooted in human dignity and the
proper treatment of individuals within a liberal society. These frameworks
are deontological ethics, dehumanization, and liberal legal theory.
Together, they provide a powerful lens for understanding the wrongs of
instrumentalizing GBV victims within the criminal legal process that goes
beyond only considering the tangible consequences of doing so. In
applying this lens, we can appreciate how these coercive and
instrumentalizing practices offend foundational values concerning
personal autonomy, limits on state power, and the respect of human
230. See Rachel Condry, Secondary Victims and Secondary Victimization, in INTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOK OF VICTIMOLOGY 219, 235 (Shlomo Giora Shoham, Paul Knepper & Martin Kett eds.,
2010) (noting that “[n]umerous studies have found professionals such as counselors or therapists,
lawyers, and the police working directly with victims of rape, sexual assault, and other forms of
interpersonal violence experience high levels of vicarious trauma”).
231. See Epstein & Goodman, supra note 136, at 452; Tamara Rice Lave, Police Sexual Violence,
in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF POLICING IN THE UNITED STATES 392, 400 (Tamara Rice Lave &
Eric J. Miller eds., 2019); Sharyn J. Potter, Reducing Sexual Assault on Campus: Lessons from the
Movement to Prevent Drunk Driving, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 822, 825 (2016); Michaels, supra note
33.
232. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 10–11 (1996). This refers to the
difficulties of comparing costs and benefits that are not reducible to a common unit of measure. For
example, the expressive value of criminal law enforcement and the practical impact on individuals’
lives cannot be converted to common, easily comparable units.
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dignity.
A.

Deontology

Deontology is a duty-based ethical theory that determines the morality
of an act with regard to its alignment with certain duties and obligations.233
Immanuel Kant’s theoretical work is central to deontological ethics and is
relevant to analyzing the moral status of instrumentalizing GBV victims
within the criminal legal process. Specifically, Kant’s well-known
“Formula of Humanity,” which prohibits the use of a human being
“merely as a means” (the “Mere Means Principle”), is a particularly
apposite framework.234
Philosophers have long discussed and debated the meaning of the
Formula of Humanity. In one such discussion, Paulus Kaufmann explores
the meaning of the colloquial expression, “to use a person.”235 He
concludes that three conditions must be fulfilled for person A to use
person B: (1) A interacts with B, (2) A does so because he believes that
B’s presence or participation can contribute to the realization of A’s goal,
and (3) A’s goal does not essentially refer to B.236 Tellingly, Kaufmann
first explains the meaning of each of these conditions using an object as
an example.237 For instance, he clarifies the third condition with a knife
illustration.238 He explains that sharpening a knife does not count as using
it because sharpness relates to the state of the knife itself.239 Importantly,
Kaufmann notes that fulfilling these three conditions does not ipso facto
render an act towards a person morally impermissible
instrumentalization.240 He points to Kant’s qualification to using a person
as a means—”merely”—to identify prohibited uses.241 Kaufmann argues
that this turns on consent, such that the person being used must consent to

233. See WARBURTON, supra note 169, at 39, 41–45.
234. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 209 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1996) (1797) (“Humanity itself is a dignity; for a human being cannot be used merely as
a means by any human being . . . but must always be used at the same time as an end.”).
235. Paulus Kaufmann, Instrumentalization: What Does It Mean to Use a Person?, in
HUMILIATION, DEGRADATION, DEHUMANIZATION: HUMAN DIGNITY VIOLATED 57, 60–61 (Paulus
Kaufmann, Hannes Kuch, Christian Neuhäeuser & Elaine Webster eds., 2010).
236. Id. at 61 n.7 (explaining that a “goal essentially refers to a person if it cannot be spelled out
without linguistically referring in any way to the person in question, be it by using proper names or
definite descriptions”).
237. Id. at 60–61.
238. Id. at 60.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 61.
241. Id.
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the interaction and its conditions for it to be morally permissible.242
Robert Audi points out that the qualifier, “merely,” usually has a
derogatory connotation.243 Without it, he descriptively characterizes
“instrumental treatment” as essentially “using its object not as something
valued in itself (even if it happens to be so valued) but to achieve a further
end.”244 In his view, this end “does not essentially contain . . . [the
concept] of the means in question” and, in principle, can be achieved by
more than a single means.245 To constitute “merely instrumental
treatment,”246 the agent must be “unconcerned with anything about the
person . . . that is not relevant to realizing the agent’s end.”247
Furthermore, Audi considers treatment “merely as a means”248 to be a type
of negative instrumental treatment where “the instrumental function of the
action in question, or some set of instrumental functions, [are] . . . in a
certain way one’s exclusive aim.”249 Thus, under Audi’s account, the
addition of “merely” connotes wrongness through the affirmative
exclusion of non-instrumental motivations towards whom the agent acts.
Similarly, Derek Parfit posits the following “rough” definition: “we
treat someone merely as a means if we both treat this person as a means,
and regard this person as a mere instrument or tool: someone whose wellbeing and moral claims we ignore, and whom we would treat in whatever
ways would best achieve our aims.”250 Like Audi’s conceptualization,
Parfit’s conveys a callousness on the part of the agent using another
person merely as a means. However, Parfit convincingly argues for an
expansion of Kant’s Mere Means Principle to encompass not only
treatment of a person merely as a means, but also treatment that “come[s]
close” to that, as morally wrong.251 He defines coming close to treating
someone merely as a means as giving “too little weight to this person’s
well-being or moral claims.”252 Under this account, treating a person
“merely as a means” and coming close to doing so are not materially
different and are morally impermissible on the same grounds. Parfit
242. Id. at 61–62.
243. ROBERT AUDI, MEANS, ENDS, AND PERSONS: THE MEANING AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
DIMENSIONS OF KANT’S HUMANITY FORMULA 21 (2015).
244. Id. at 17 (emphasis in original).
245. Id. at 15.
246. Id. at 26 (emphasis in original).
247. Id. at 25 (emphasis in original).
248. Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
249. Id. (emphasis in original).
250. 1 DEREK PARFIT, ON WHAT MATTERS 213 (2011) (emphasis in original).
251. Id. at 214.
252. Id.
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provides the example of a hypothetical slaveholder who gave slight
weight to his slaves’ well-being and, as a result, allowed them to rest
during the hottest part of the day.253 The slaveholder would not be treating
his slaves “merely as a means” because his motivations were not
exclusively instrumental in nature.254 However, since they come close to
being entirely instrumental, his treatment of his slaves would be morally
impermissible under Parfit’s minimally expanded principle.255
It is important that we return to the concept of consent. Recall that
Kaufmann views the meaning of “merely” using a person as fulfilling the
three conditions for using another and doing so without that person’s
consent.256 Other Kantian scholars agree that consent should be part of the
equation. For example, Samuel Kerstein asserts that “merely” should not
be taken literally and that using someone “merely as a means” denotes
“us[ing] the person in a way that does not exhibit sufficient respect for the
person’s rational agency, that is, for her capacity to determine how she is
used and to rationally pursue her ends.”257 In other words, it is morally
problematic to insufficiently respect a rational agent’s consent and
freedom of choice in relation to her own life and goals. Kaufmann
similarly identifies the capacity to set and pursue ends as the property that
is impaired when a person is used “merely as a means” because the user
fully prioritizes the realization of her own ends over those of the other
person.258 He further argues that this property is valuable and bestows a
special status upon the bearer—the status of possessing human dignity—
which places constraints on how she may be treated.259 On this basis,
Kaufmann concludes that treating a person “merely as a means” without
her consent violates her dignity.260
The U.S. Supreme Court has espoused this conception of dignity in
portions of its abortion jurisprudence. In Thornburgh v. American College
of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,261 Justice Blackmun, writing for the
majority, recognizes that a woman’s decision regarding whether to have
an abortion is “basic to [her] individual dignity and autonomy.”262 Despite
253. Id. at 213.
254. See id.; see also AUDI, supra note 243, at 22.
255. See PARFIT, supra note 250, at 214.
256. Kaufmann, supra note 235, at 62.
257. SAMUEL J. KERSTEIN, HOW TO TREAT PERSONS 82 (2013).
258. Kaufmann, supra note 235, at 63.
259. Id. at 63–65.
260. Id. at 62–63.
261. 476 U.S. 747 (1986), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992).
262. Id. at 772.
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partially overruling Thornburgh, the plurality in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey263 reiterates the assertion that a
woman’s ability to choose whether to continue her pregnancy is “central
to [her] personal dignity and autonomy.”264 Reva Siegel characterizes this
invocation of “dignity” as “protect[ing] the ability of women to make selfdefining and self-governing choices,”265 which aligns with Kerstein and
Kaufmann’s focus on an individual’s ability to choose and pursue her own
ends.
Consent to being used is only valid if it is informed and given freely.
Regarding the former condition, Parfit rightly maintains that a person
must know the relevant facts, including the effects an act may have, for
rational consent to be meaningful.266 Both a lack of relevant information
and deception with respect to this information preclude informed consent.
The latter condition for valid consent, that it is given “freely,” raises the
issue of coercion. On these points, Christine Korsgaard argues that
“[c]oercion and deception violate the conditions of possible assent, and
all actions which depend for their nature and efficacy on their coercive or
deceptive character are ones that others cannot assent to.”267 Similarly,
Onora O’Neill concludes that
if we coerce or deceive others, their dissent, and so their genuine
consent, is in principle ruled out. Here we do indeed use others,
treating them as mere props or tools in our own projects. Even the
most rational and independent cannot genuinely consent to
proposals about which they are deceived or with which they are
compelled to comply.268
Therefore, when coercion or deception are employed to secure an
individual’s ostensible consent to being used merely as a means, the
instrumentalization is just as morally unacceptable as it would have been
had the instrumentalized person not expressed her “consent” to being

263. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
264. Id. at 851. Alarmingly, it looks as though the Court is set to overrule this key liberal value in
Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 945 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 141 S.
Ct. 2619 (2021). See Josh Gerstein & Alexander Ward, Supreme Court Has Voted to Overturn
Abortion Rights, Draft Opinion Shows, POLITICO (May 3, 2022, 2:14 PM),
http://www.politico.com/news/2022/05/02/supreme-court-abortion-draft-opinion-00029473
[https://perma.cc/UD3D-CEBE].
265. Siegel, supra note 97, at 1740.
266. PARFIT, supra note 250, at 184.
267. CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 140 (1996).
268. ONORA O’NEILL, CONSTRUCTIONS OF REASON: EXPLORATIONS OF KANT’S PRACTICAL
PHILOSOPHY 111 (1989).
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treated as such.269
“Coercion” is a complex and contested concept, thereby requiring
additional clarification.270 Due to the power the coercer wields over the
coercee, the former is able to “force” the latter to comply with his
wishes.271 Coercion can be carried out via both physical and non-physical
means,272 such that the coercee’s compliance becomes a “practical
imperative”—as a rational agent, the coercee yields to the will of the
coercer because doing so accords with practical reason.273 This Article
takes the view, like O’Neill and others, that both threats of harm and offers
of benefit can be coercive.274 Regardless of whether the coercer presents
a threat or an offer, the coercee’s agency is curtailed by the coercer’s
power and willingness to impose unacceptable consequences upon the
coercee if she fails to comply.275 Thus, if an individual’s “consent” to
being instrumentalized is secured under coercive circumstances, it does
not provide moral cover for the coercer’s instrumental treatment of the
coercee.
Let us now apply this deontological framework to the practices of
arresting and incarcerating GBV victims through material witness
269. See JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 188 (1989) (asserting that “invalid consent is no better
than no consent at all” (emphasis in original)).
270. See Scott Anderson, Coercion, STAN. ENCYC. PHIL. (Oct. 27, 2011),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/coercion/#ConPhiAccCoe [https://perma.cc/6G98-3ANG]; see also
Onora O’Neill, Which Are the Offers You Can’t Refuse?, in VIOLENCE, TERRORISM, AND JUSTICE
170, 170–71 (R. G. Frey & Christopher W. Morris eds., 1991).
271. See Joan McGregor, Bargaining Advantages and Coercion in the Market, 14 PHIL. RSCH.
ARCHIVES 23, 25 (1988–89) (arguing that “coercion involves exercising power over another”);
O’Neill, supra note 270, at 172, 191–92 (pointing out that “[p]ower depends on differentials” and that
the vulnerability of those who are coerced lies in their relatively lesser “capacities, powers, or
resources” vis-à-vis their coercer).
272. See O’Neill, supra note 270, at 172–73 (explaining that coercion can involve violent or nonviolent methods); FEINBERG, supra note 269, at 253, 264, 267–68 (exemplifying how economic
power, ability to inflict physical injury, and knowledge of an individual’s secrets can be vehicles for
effectuating coercion); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously: Rape Law and
Beyond, 11 LAW & PHIL. 35, 55 (1992) (identifying “physical, psychological, economical,
intellectual, or quasi-official” as forms of coercive power).
273. Mark Fowler, Coercion and Practical Reason, 8 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 329, 330–31 (1982)
(defining “practical reason” as morality and prudence, which demand action in response to particular
circumstances).
274. See O’Neill, supra note 270, at 190–91; FEINBERG, supra note 269, at 216–19, 229–33;
Virginia Held, Coercion and Coercive Offers, in COERCION 49, 54–57 (J. Roland Pennock & John
W. Chapman eds., 1972); Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional
Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 15 n.56 (2001); David Zimmerman, Coercive Wage
Offers, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 121, 131–38 (1981). But see, e.g., J.P. Day, Threats, Offers, Law,
Opinion and Liberty, 14 AM. PHIL. Q. 257, 262, 265–66 (1977) (claiming, rather curiously, that offers
cannot be coercive because it is “extreme temptation,” rather than an offer itself, that exerts coercive
influence).
275. See O’Neill, supra note 270, at 181–82, 185; see also Fowler, supra note 273, at 331–32.
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warrants and contempt power, threatening and bringing criminal charges
against them, and conditioning key assistance measures upon their
cooperation in the criminal legal process. At the outset, we must ask
whether the state’s use of these practices treats victims “merely as a
means,” in violation of Kant’s Formula of Humanity.276 The first step of
this inquiry is determining whether the state is “using” victims. Applying
Kaufmann’s three conditions, we see that they are easily satisfied when
the state employs these tactics against GBV victims for utilitarian reasons:
(1) state actors—law enforcement, prosecutors, judges, and others—
interact with victims, (2) they do so because they believe that victims’
participation can contribute to the realization of the state’s goal of
effectively investigating, prosecuting, and convicting GBV offenders, and
(3) this goal does not “essentially refer to” victims, but rather is directed
to the perpetrators of GBV crimes.277 However, if the state’s motives are
wholly paternalistic rather than utilitarian, Kaufmann’s third condition is
not met, as the goal would be directed at the “state” of victims and their
“best interests.”278
Similarly, under Audi’s conceptualization of “instrumental treatment,”
the practices qualify because the recipients of the treatment—GBV
victims—are not treated in a way that reflects their own value as ends in
themselves, but instead are used to achieve the state’s further end of
investigating, prosecuting, and convicting offenders.279 But if the relevant
state actors engage in the tactics solely for paternalistic reasons, their
“further end” is to benefit or protect GBV victims, which “essentially
contain[s] [the concept] of the means in question.”280 Yet, in light of Amy
Farrell and her collaborators’ empirical research with a large sample of
federal, state, and local government actors across the country, it appears
that utilitarian motives likely feature more prominently than paternalistic
ones when the practices at issue are utilized with GBV victims (even if
motives are mixed).281 Moreover, with respect to certain consequences for
victims if they choose not to participate in the criminal legal process in
spite of state actors’ use of these coercive practices—such as being
criminally prosecuted or denied vital assistance measures—it would be
untenable for governmental actors imposing these consequences to claim
276. See KANT, supra note 234.
277. Id. at 60–61.
278. See id. at 60.
279. See AUDI, supra note 243, at 17.
280. See id. at 15, 17 (emphasis in original).
281. See generally FARRELL ET AL., supra note 27; Farrell et al., supra note 28 (showing findings
more reflective of utilitarian than paternalistic motives for law enforcement’s use of practices that
coerce and instrumentalize GBV victims).
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that they are doing so to protect or benefit these victims (as paternalism
would require).282 Thus, it is highly probable that, in the majority of cases,
state actors employ the tactics at issue primarily for non-paternalistic
reasons.283 When doing so, they are treating victims as a “means.”
The second step of the inquiry requires assessing whether the state
treats GBV victims “merely” as a means when it employs the practices
described in Part I, which would render them morally impermissible
under the Kantian framework. According to scholars like Kaufmann and
Kerstein, this is a question of whether the individual being used has
consented to the use and its conditions (the “kind of interaction”).284
Victims who are arrested and incarcerated on material witness warrants or
for contempt of court, for example, presumably have not consented to
being “used” to realize the state’s prosecutorial goals and the conditions
of the state’s interaction with them. Indeed, in many documented cases,
the victim has made her desire not to testify explicitly clear to the relevant
state actors.285 But even if a subset of detained victims would have
consented to being used to convict their abusers,286 they most certainly
would not have consented to the conditions of the state’s interaction with
them—arrest and imprisonment. Furthermore, the “consent” of victims
during their incarceration on a civil contempt order that provides for their
release upon their agreement to testify (or when threatened with this type
of order) should not be considered genuine due to coercion. Being
deprived of their liberty through detention in a penal facility is sufficiently
severe for compliance with the state’s demands to become a “practical
imperative” for many rational agents, and thus the state’s use of this power
is highly coercive.287 By the same token, GBV victims who “consent” to

282. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
283. This includes not only utilitarian reasons but also other types of reasons, such as self-serving
ones (e.g., a prosecutor who wants to improve his win-loss rate).
284. See Kaufmann, supra note 235, at 61–62; KERSTEIN, supra note 257.
285. See, e.g., Transcript of Nov. 6, 2013, supra note 45; State v. Riensche, 812 N.W.2d 293, 295–
96 (Neb. 2012); Stillman, supra note 30; Riley, supra note 30.
286. At times, GBV victims who fail to respond to a subpoena would have been willing to testify
in court but did not appear because they had not received the subpoena, they had a conflict with the
scheduled time, or they had another issue that prevented them from appearing in court at the specified
time. See, e.g., Barber, supra note 38 (quoting the attorney for a domestic violence victim arrested
and detained on a material witness warrant explaining that the victim had “fully intended to testify”
and had not replied to the two subpoenas that had been issued for her because they had been sent to
the wrong address). Furthermore, some GBV victims jailed on material witness warrants expressed
their willingness to cooperate and testify, yet the state continued to detain them. See, e.g., WU &
YELDERMAN, supra note 30, at 20 (describing a federal human trafficking case in which victims from
Mexico who “were willing to testify and cooperate with law enforcement . . . remained in detention
for more than four months – first on material witness warrants, and then in ICE custody”).
287. See Fowler, supra note 273, at 330–32.
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participating in the criminal legal process because they are faced with
criminal prosecution or ineligibility for much-needed assistance measures
that they cannot otherwise readily obtain are not doing so freely. By
instrumentalizing victims without their free and informed consent, the
state fails to “exhibit sufficient respect for [their] rational agency, that is,
for [their] capacity to determine how [they are] used and to rationally
pursue [their] ends.”288 These ends may include a desire to move on from
past traumatic experiences, prioritize their family’s financial stability,
reduce state intervention in their lives, or seek to resolve conflicts with
their abuser outside of the criminal legal system.289
Under Audi’s conceptualization of treating an individual “merely as a
means,” “the instrumental function of the action in question . . . [is] in a
certain way one’s exclusive aim.”290 This appears to often be the case
when state actors engage in the practices articulated in Part I. For instance,
the explicit aim of detaining a material witness is to secure that
individual’s testimony in a criminal proceeding,291 which instrumentalizes
her in the prosecution of the offender. And the above excerpts from Farrell
et al.’s research provide support for this assertion with respect to the
tactics of criminally charging GBV victims and offering them conditional
assistance.292 For example, the excerpt from a law enforcement agent
clearly states that charging victims with felonies resulted in “exactly what
we had anticipated”—i.e., that it would be an effective means of coercing
victims into becoming “cooperative witnesses.”293 In addition, the
prosecutor’s interview excerpt about “breaking a few eggs,” which Farrell
et al. indicate was echoed by other law enforcement officials in the study,
reflects the view that arresting and charging victims with prostitution is
“necessary to get them to ‘flip’ and provide information that could lead to
successful prosecution of pimps and other individuals who may be part of
a larger trafficking network.”294 Thus, charging victims serves the
instrumental function of advancing this further, and arguably primary,
goal. Even if state actors’ motivations for charging victims are not
exclusively instrumental in nature, under Parfit’s minimally expanded
Mere Means Principle, their use of victims in this way would still be
morally objectionable because their aims “come close” to being entirely
288. KERSTEIN, supra note 257, at 82.
289. See Nichols, supra note 12; Wechsler, supra note 12, at 1078–79; see also SERED, supra note
6, at 42–49, 186–90.
290. AUDI, supra note 243, at 22.
291. 18 U.S.C. § 3144; see also NAT’L CRIME VICTIM L. INST., SURVEY, supra note 32.
292. See supra sections I.B–.C.
293. See FARRELL ET AL., supra note 27, at 116–17.
294. See Farrell et al., supra note 28, at 64.
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instrumental.295
Likewise, Farrell et al. found that law enforcement “stressed the need
to connect victims to services primarily for the purpose of securing [their]
cooperation and developing a case against the perpetrator.”296
Accordingly, the instrumental function of assisting victims is these state
actors’ primary aim in doing so, which indicates that the treatment comes
close to regarding victims merely as a means.297 This also reflects the
conceptualization of victims as essentially “mere instrument[s] or
tool[s]”298—“‘evidence’ that need[s] to be secured and stabilised.”299 State
actors know that service providers can “secure” victims in a shelter and/or
by keeping track of them (e.g., staying in frequent contact with them and
obtaining updates to their contact information), and that victims who are
receiving services that meet their needs in a particular location are less
likely to move away in search of ways to meet their needs. This makes
them more available and accessible to law enforcement authorities.
Receiving services can also “stabilize” victims in ways that enable them
to serve as good “evidence” in the eyes of law enforcement. For example,
mental health counseling can reduce PTSD-related behaviors that can
affect perceived credibility as a witness.300
Moreover, a significant aspect of conditional assistance practices that
is highly relevant to our inquiry is the fact that victims who fail to satisfy
the state’s condition(s) are not provided with the assistance. Given the
considerable needs of many GBV victims as they exit abusive situations
and in the aftermath of their victimization,301 depriving them of certain
assistance measures because they do not (or do not sufficiently) assist the
state with realizing its prosecutorial ends gives “too little weight to [their]
well-being.”302 This demonstrates a lack of concern about victims to the
extent that they are not useful in achieving the state’s goals—a marker of
“merely” and “close to merely” instrumental treatment.303
Insufficient concern for GBV victims’ well-being is also apparent when
295. See PARFIT, supra note 250, at 213–14.
296. Farrell et al., supra note 64, at 664.
297. See AUDI, supra note 243, at 22; PARFIT, supra note 250, at 214.
298. See PARFIT, supra note 250, at 213.
299. Farrell et al., supra note 28, at 63.
300. See Louise Ellison, Closing the Credibility Gap: The Prosecutorial Use of Expert Witness
Testimony in Sexual Assault Cases, 9 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 239, 241 (2005) (“Psychological
studies, in particular, suggest that commonly assumed credibility cues are potentially misleading
when applied to the testimony of those who have witnessed or experienced a traumatic event, such as
sexual assault.”).
301. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
302. See PARFIT, supra note 250, at 214.
303. See id. at 212–14; AUDI, supra note 243, at 25.
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the state compels their participation in the criminal legal process through
the use of material witness warrants, contempt power, and criminal
charges in order to advance its prosecutorial agenda. Arrest and
incarceration (even for brief periods) are extremely harmful to GBV
victims’ well-being, as is being criminally charged and potentially
convicted.304 There is evidence that many police, prosecutors, and other
state actors are aware of this harm and are willing to “break[] a few
eggs.”305 The continuation of these practices in spite of an awareness of
the serious harms they cause demonstrates that certain state actors assign
insufficient import to victims’ well-being and are willing to essentially
“treat [them] in whatever ways would best achieve [their] aims.”306 Even
where state actors make certain efforts to mitigate the harmful impact on
victims’ well-being (e.g., arresting them closer in time to their scheduled
testimony to decrease their period of detention), the practices at issue
“come close” enough to purely instrumental treatment to be considered
morally objectionable under Parfit’s minimally expanded Mere Means
Principle.307
Based on the foregoing analysis, we can conclude that the state often
treats GBV victims “merely as a means” or close to this when it employs
the tactics described in Part I to coerce their participation in the criminal
legal process. In doing so, it causes dignitary harm to victims and acts in
a morally impermissible manner under a deontological, Kantian-based
ethical approach.
B.

Dehumanization

Instrumentalizing a person is often dehumanizing. Broadly speaking,
dehumanization means depriving a person of full human character,
attributes, or dignity.308 Like “mere” instrumental treatment,
304. See discussion of the harms to GBV victims caused by arrest, incarceration, and
criminalization, supra notes 117–121, 144–156 and accompanying text.
305. See Farrell et al., supra note 28, at 64 (stating that “the subjects . . . interviewed were
knowledgeable and concerned about the potential for arrest or detention resulting in long-term victim
harm”); Farrell et al., supra note 64, at 662 (finding that police officers in the southern U.S. study site
understood that “arresting a potential victim may be further traumatizing, but ultimately, they felt they
had few other options if the victim refused to provide sufficient information about his or her
victimization”); see also Transcript of Nov. 6, 2013, supra note 45, at 12 (recognizing that
incarcerating a human trafficking victim who did not want to testify would cause her “to suffer more
than she already has”).
306. See PARFIT, supra note 250, at 213–14.
307. See id.
308. See Dehumanize, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2021); Dehumanize, MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY (2021), http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dehumanize [https://perma.cc/
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dehumanization is a complex concept that has received significant
scholarly attention.309 The two concepts are linked in their relation to
treating humans essentially as objects. We recall that Parfit’s rough
definition of Kant’s Mere Means Principle included the treatment of a
person as a “mere instrument or tool,”310 terms which are primarily
associated with devices, machines, and other inanimate objects.311
Similarly, social psychologist Nick Haslam identifies a “mechanistic”
form of dehumanization, which is characterized by viewing humans as
“object- or automaton-like.”312 This type of dehumanization involves
denying others core human characteristics, including individual agency
and self-determination.313 Haslam recognizes Martha Nussbaum’s work
on the objectification of women as an example of theory explicating a type
of mechanistic dehumanization.314
Nussbaum identifies seven forms of objectification, which she defines
as treating a human being as an object.315 For our purposes, the most
significant of these are instrumentality (objectifier treats a person as a tool
for his purposes), denial of autonomy (objectifier treats a person “as
lacking in autonomy and self-determination”), inertness (objectifier treats

D7LX-9RXV]; Nick Haslam, Dehumanization: An Integrative Review, 10 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. REV. 252, 252 (2006).
309. See, e.g., Haslam, supra note 308 (integrating work on dehumanization from various fields
and advancing a new theoretical model identifying two distinct forms of dehumanization); Herbert C.
Kelman, Violence Without Moral Restraint: Reflections on the Dehumanization of Victims and
Victimizers, 29 J. SOC. ISSUES 25, 38, 48–52 (1973) (theorizing the role of dehumanization in
sanctioned massacres); Dayna Bowen Matthew, On Charlottesville, 105 VA. L. REV. 269, 289–90
(2019) (analyzing the role of dehumanization in racism and racial segregation); Adam Waytz &
Juliana Schroeder, Overlooking Others: Dehumanization by Comission [sic] and Omission, 21 TPM
251 (2014) (identifying and distinguishing between dehumanization by commission and
dehumanization by omission).
310. PARFIT, supra note 250, at 213.
311. See Instrument, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2022) (defining “instrument” first in terms
of inanimate objects and only referencing persons in the third definition provided); Tool, OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2022) (defining “tool” first in terms of inanimate objects and only referencing
persons in the third definition provided); Instrument, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2022)
(defining “instrument” first in terms of inanimate objects and only referencing persons in the fourth
definition provided); Tool, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2022) (defining “tool” first in terms of
inanimate objects and only referencing persons third definition provided); see also Jessica M. LaCroix
& Felicia Pratto, Instrumentality and the Denial of Personhood: The Social Psychology of
Objectifying Others, 28 REVUE INTERNATIONALE PSYCHOLOGIE SOCIALE 183, 203 (2015) (arguing
that “using people as tools is the key way that people treat others as things”).
312. Haslam, supra note 308, at 258 (differentiating this form of dehumanization from the
“animalistic” form).
313. Id. at 256–60.
314. Id. at 260.
315. Martha C. Nussbaum, Objectification, 24 PHIL. & PUB AFFS. 249, 257 (1995) (identifying
fungibility, violability, and ownership as features of objectification as well).
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a person “as lacking in agency”), and denial of subjectivity (objectifier
treats a person “as something whose experience and feelings . . . need not
be taken into account”).316 Importantly, Nussbaum notes that treatment
reflecting just one of these manners can constitute objectification, but that
the term is more often applied when multiple features are present.317
Further, different aspects of objectification often relate to one another. For
example, Nussbaum builds upon Kantian principles to demonstrate the
connection between instrumentality and denial of autonomy, contending
that treating someone “primarily or merely as an instrument” negates that
person’s proper human autonomy and dehumanizes her.318 This
conceptualization tracks Haslam’s mechanistic model of dehumanization,
as autonomy is a fundamental human attribute that is denied to a person
who is treated in this manner, thereby rendering her object-like.319
Like Kaufmann, Nussbaum maintains that there exist instances of
instrumentalization which are not morally problematic, and that the Mere
Means Principle identifies a subset of morally impermissible instrumental
treatment.320 However, Nussbaum’s addition of “primarily” goes further
than Kaufmann does and invokes Parfit’s expansion of the Mere Means
Principle to cover treatment that “come[s] close” to regarding a person
merely as a means.321 She also emphasizes the need to examine the overall
context in determining whether a person is being treated primarily or
merely as an instrument, which is a broader approach than Kaufmann’s
focus only on consent.322 In doing so, she concludes that
instrumentalization is highly morally objectionable when “it does not take
place in a larger context of regard for humanity,” thus connecting the
concept with dehumanization.323 Relevant contextual information
includes, but is not limited to, whether there exists mutual respect and
(roughly) equal social power among the parties, consent to being

316. Id.
317. Id. at 258.
318. Id. at 265 (emphasis in original) (arguing that “there is something especially problematic about
instrumentalizing human beings, something that involves denying what is fundamental to them as
human beings, namely, the status of beings [sic] ends in themselves”); see also LaCroix & Pratto,
supra note 311, at 196 (“The denial of autonomy and self-determination is implicit in the concept of
instrumentalizing Others as tools to meet an Agent’s own ends—tools enable others to do things; they
do not set their own goals and tasks.” (emphasis in original)).
319. See Haslam, supra note 308, at 256–58.
320. See Kaufmann, supra note 235, at 61; Nussbaum, supra note 315, at 265.
321. See Kaufmann, supra note 235, at 61–62; Nussbaum, supra note 315, at 265; PARFIT, supra
note 250, at 214.
322. See Nussbaum, supra note 315, at 265, 271, 289; Kaufmann, supra note 235, at 61–62, 64–
65.
323. Nussbaum, supra note 315, at 289.
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instrumentalized, recognition of individuality, and genuine concern about
the instrumentalized person’s needs and experiences.324 In addition to
these individual relational elements, overarching societal norms and
historical power dynamics must be considered in assessing the moral
status of instrumentalizing and objectifying treatment.325 When contextual
features of this treatment indicate a lack of regard for a person’s humanity,
such as a failure to obtain that person’s consent, account for her individual
needs, and appreciate the impact of current and historical relational
dynamics, the treatment is dehumanizing and morally objectionable.
When applying this framework to the state’s coercion and
instrumentalization of GBV victims within the criminal legal process, we
can see how treating them in this way is dehumanizing. The tactics
detailed in Part I deny them core human attributes—the ability to exercise
individual agency and engage in self-determination regarding significant
decisions in their lives—thereby corresponding with Haslam’s
“mechanistic” form of dehumanization.326 Furthermore, the four relevant
forms of objectification from Nussbaum’s model are reflected in the
practices at issue. First, “instrumentality”—the state treats the victim
merely or primarily as a tool for its own purposes, which are investigating,
prosecuting, and convicting GBV offenders.327 Second, “[d]enial of
autonomy”—the state disregards the victim’s capacity for autonomy and
self-determination by depriving her of the opportunity to make her own
decision regarding her participation in the criminal legal process.328 Third,
“[i]nertness”—the state treats the victim as “lacking in agency” and
incapable of making rational decisions and taking action in her own life
in response to GBV.329 Fourth, “[d]enial of subjectivity”—the state fails
to properly account for the victim’s feelings and experiences with respect
to her participation in the criminal legal process and also to being arrested,
jailed, charged, criminalized, and/or denied conditional assistance
measures.330
Even if state actors engage in the practices at issue for ostensibly
paternalistic reasons, they still deny GBV victims core human attributes
of adult human beings, such as the capacity to decide what constitutes
their own best interests and act accordingly. Moreover, the state’s failure
324. See id. at 271–90 (examining these contextual features mainly within literary examples of
objectification).
325. See id. at 269, 271–72, 277, 290.
326. See Haslam, supra note 308, at 256–60.
327. See Nussbaum, supra note 315, at 257, 261, 265.
328. See id. at 257.
329. See id.
330. See id.
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to properly account for victims’ subjective experiences and feelings has
most likely contributed to its miscalculation regarding how to effectively
advance their best interests, in line with the goals of paternalism.331
Nussbaum reminds us to examine the overall context of the treatment
to determine whether it is, in fact, morally problematic objectification and
dehumanization.332 There are several factors that strongly suggest that the
use of material witness warrants, contempt power, criminal charges, and
conditional assistance to coerce GBV victims’ participation in the
criminal legal process “does not take place in a larger context of regard
for humanity.”333 These include the vastly greater power of the state as
compared with the individual, the lack of consent to being
instrumentalized, the insufficient weight accorded to victims’ subjective
experiences and needs, and the existence of current and historical norms
disempowering GBV victims.334 Even as they have evolved, societal
norms have served to legitimize violence against women and perpetuate
their subordination.335 For example, the myth that women “ask” to be
raped manifested in the examination of accusers’ behavior relative to
historical expectations around women’s modesty and respectability in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, such as whether they ventured into
public spaces without their male guardians or socialized alone with
men.336 In the present day, this myth is reflected in the focus on whether
accusers wore provocative clothing, consumed alcohol or drugs or were
walking alone at night.337 Victim precipitation and other rape myths “are
endorsed by a substantial segment of the population and permeate legal,
331. See supra section II.A.
332. See Nussbaum, supra note 315, at 265, 271, 289.
333. See id. at 289.
334. See id. at 271–90. See generally Epstein & Goodman, supra note 136 (discussing societal
norms which discount women’s credibility and dismiss their experiences of abuse from men); Patricia
L. N. Donat & John D’Emilio, A Feminist Redefinition of Rape and Sexual Assault: Historical
Foundations and Change, 48 J. SOC. ISSUES 9 (1992) (explaining the role of patriarchal power
structures and societal norms in promoting and maintaining disempowering conceptualizations of
sexual violence and its victims from the colonial period through the twentieth century); Katie M.
Edwards, Jessica A. Turchik, Christina M. Dardis, Nicole Reynolds & Christine A. Gidyez, Rape
Myths: History, Individual and Institutional-Level Presence, and Implications for Change, 65 SEX
ROLES 761 (2011) (documenting the current prevalence and historical origins of rape myths among
individuals and institutions in the U.S.).
335. See Edwards et al., supra note 334, at 762. Both subordination and objectification constitute
“improper treatment of persons that fails to recognize the other as bearing the same human status as
oneself.” RADIN, supra note 232, at 157.
336. See Kim Stevenson, Unequivocal Victims: The Historical Roots of the Mystification of the
Female Complainant in Rape Cases, 8 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 343, 361 (2000); Barbara S.
Lindemann, “To Ravish and Carnally Know”: Rape in Eighteenth-Century Massachusetts, 10 SIGNS:
J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC’Y 63, 66, 82 (1984).
337. Edwards et al., supra note 334, at 766–67.
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media, and religious institutions.”338 More broadly, there exists “a longstanding tendency to trivialize women’s experiences of abuse at the hands
of powerful, predatory men” and “[w]omen find their credibility
discounted . . . by the larger society in which they live.”339 These types of
norms contribute to a context in which GBV victims’ personhood is
compromised.340 When the state treats them primarily as instrumentalities
of the criminal legal system, denies their autonomy and agency, and/or
insufficiently accounts for their subjectivity within this wider context, it
deprives them of their full human character, attributes, and dignity. Under
Nussbaum’s framework, this type of treatment is morally unacceptable.
C.

Liberal Legal Principles

Central to the liberal legal order lies the principle that individuals
possess rights that protect them from being sacrificed for the greater
good.341 In this sense, humans are considered inviolable.342 A liberal legal
system “treat[s] each individual as worthy of respect simply because he
or she is a free and purposive being . . . [and does not treat them] as a
thing, that is, merely as a potential means to the objectives of the state or
of another person.”343 This foundational liberal value aligns with Kant’s
Mere Means Principle and related moral prohibitions on forms of

338. Id. at 762.
339. Epstein & Goodman, supra note 136, at 402 (internal citation omitted).
340. See RADIN, supra note 232, at 157. Their personhood is compromised even further in cases
where harmful gender-based norms intersect with those associated with socially subordinated races,
classes, and other statuses. See generally Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241
(1991).
341. Jacob Bronsther, The Corrective Justice Theory of Punishment, 107 VA. L. REV. 227, 235–36
(2021) [hereinafter Bronsther, Corrective Justice]; see also ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND
UTOPIA 31–33 (1974) (asserting that the state may not sacrifice an individual for the sake of the
greater overall good because doing so fails to “sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that
he is a separate person”); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3–4, 513 (Harvard Univ. Press rev.
ed. 1999) (arguing that to respect persons is to “affirm that the loss of freedom for some is not made
right by a greater welfare enjoyed by others”).
342. NOZICK, supra note 341; RAWLS, supra note 341, at 513; Carlos Santiago Nino, Liberty,
Equality and Causality, 15 RECHTSTHEORIE 23, 23 (1984) (conceiving of the “principle of the
inviolability of the person” roughly as a prohibition on “causing people harms or imposing sacrifices
on them, against their will, for the sake of achieving goals which do not include primarily
considerations about the well-being of those very people”); see also Jacob Bronsther, Vague
Comparisons and Proportional Sentencing, 25 LEGAL THEORY 26, 48 (2019) (formulating the
“principle of human inviolability” as a moral proscription on harming individuals for the “purpose of
mitigating social harms or threats for which they lack responsibility”) [hereinafter Bronsther, Vague
Comparisons].
343. Hamish Stewart, The Right to Be Presumed Innocent, 8 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 407, 408 (2014).
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instrumentalization, dehumanization, and objectification.344 More
broadly, it reflects liberalism’s commitment to individualism, autonomy,
and limits on state power.345
However, there are certain limits to the “non-sacrifice” principle within
liberal legal systems.346 Ronald Dworkin, for example, contends that the
state is justified in overriding an individual’s rights for compelling reasons
such as to prevent a catastrophe or to protect others’ rights, but cannot do
so simply based on its judgment that it will likely benefit the general
welfare.347 Similarly, Louis Henkin emphasizes that an individual’s rights
may be infringed upon on a narrow set of critical public emergency,
national security, and public order grounds, but adds that “a society may
derogate from rights only to the extent strictly required by the exigencies
of the situation.”348 John Rawls argues that sacrificing individuals is
permitted in certain exigent circumstances, such as through military
conscription when war is necessary “for the defense of liberty itself,” but
maintains that this should be carried out in an equitable manner that
distributes the burdens evenly among all members of society and avoids
class bias.349 Despite these exceptions to the non-sacrifice principle,
Henkin and others agree that there exists a core of fundamental rights
which the state cannot invade under any circumstances (though its precise
boundaries are debated).350
344. See supra sections III.A., III.B.
345. See HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT:
LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 188–90 (1st ed. 1996).
346. Bronsther, Corrective Justice, supra note 341, at 236.
347. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 191–94 (1977).
348. LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 4 (1990).
349. RAWLS, supra note 341, at 333–34.
350. See HENKIN, supra note 348, at 4 (maintaining that “[e]ven in an authentic emergency, a
society . . . may not derogate from basic rights: they must not invade the right to life, or involve torture
or cruel, inhuman punishment, slavery or servitude, conviction of crime under ex post facto laws,
denial of rights as a person before the law, or violate freedom of thought, conscience, or religion”);
Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 867, 872–80 (1960) (arguing that the Bill
of Rights contains absolute rights, including the rights to a jury trial, public trial, and freedom of
religion, speech, and press); Frédéric Mégret, Nature of Obligations, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW 96, 110 (Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah & Sandesh Sivakumaran eds., 2d ed. 2014)
(asserting that “[o]ne of the only absolute rights is the right to be free from torture, which is absolute
in the sense that no social goal or emergency can ever limit the categorical prohibition of torture”);
see also ILIAS BANTEKAS & LUTZ OETTE, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW AND PRACTICE 68–
69 (1st ed. 2013) (explaining that there exists no clear-cut list of jus cogens rights and the jus cogens
status of particular rights is often contested). Even Mark Rosen, an ardent opponent of rights
absolutism, admits that the Thirteenth Amendment may be an absolute constitutional right. Mark D.
Rosen, When Are Constitutional Rights Non-Absolute?: McCutcheon, Conflicts, and the Sufficiency
Question, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1535, 1541 n.15 (2015). But see RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR
HEDGEHOGS 473 n.1 (2011) (arguing that individual rights are “trumps” but may be overridden by a
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In interpreting the core of the non-sacrifice principle, Jacob Bronsther
argues that, at a minimum, the principle protects an individual from being
intentionally and significantly harmed without her consent in order to
mitigate a social problem for which she lacks responsibility.351 Bronsther
applies this general principle to the social problem of future crime to argue
that the state should only subject offenders to the amount of penal harm
that corresponds with their past contributions to societal criminality.352 He
maintains that doing so would avoid sacrificing offenders because they
are responsible for an increase in the objective threat of crime within
society.353 In contrast, when we apply Bronsther’s formulation of the nonsacrifice principle to crime victims, harming them intentionally and
significantly without their consent for the purpose of reducing future
crime would constitute an impermissible sacrifice because, unlike
offenders, they bear no responsibility for this social problem. To conclude
otherwise with respect to the “responsibility” element would amount to
“victim blaming.”354
We must also acknowledge that not all types of harm rise to the level
of “sacrificing” a person. According to Bronsther, the level of harm must
be “significant[].”355 Presumably, violating an individual’s fundamental
rights would count,356 but mildly bruising her arm would not. Bronsther
applies his interpretation of the non-sacrifice principle’s core within the
context of penal harm, which is sufficiently severe to rise to the level of
harm associated with the concept of “sacrificing” a person.357 Likewise,
“higher trump” consisting of “competing interests [that] are grave and urgent, as they might be when
large numbers of lives or the survival of a state is in question”); Rosen, supra, at 1544 (characterizing
Dworkin’s approach as “too subtle to justifiably equate trumps and absoluteness”).
351. Bronsther, Corrective Justice, supra note 341, at 236; Bronsther, Vague Comparisons, supra
note 342.
352. Bronsther, Corrective Justice, supra note 341, at 234.
353. Id. at 232–34.
354. See Christina Mancini & Justin T. Pickett, Reaping What They Sow? Victim-Offender Overlap
Perceptions and Victim Blaming Attitudes, 12 VICTIMS & OFFENDERS 434, 434–35, 452 (2017)
(defining victim blaming as an enduring social phenomenon in which crime victims are perceived as
having contributed to their own victimization); MELVIN J. LERNER, THE BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD: A
FUNDAMENTAL DELUSION 11–12, 21–22, 125 (1980) (explaining that people irrationally reinterpret
injustices by attributing their causation to something that the victim did or failed to do, or to personal
attributes of the victim, as a means of maintaining their belief in a “just world” in which people get
what they deserve).
355. Bronsther, Corrective Justice, supra note 341, at 236.
356. See Nino, supra note 342, at 25, 29–30 (positing that depriving a person of the goods that are
necessary for the choice in or materialization of her life plans—including life, bodily integrity, and
access to knowledge and economic resources—constitutes “sacrificing” her).
357. Bronsther, Corrective Justice, supra note 341, at 231, 233–34; see also Rinat Kitai, Protecting
the Guilty, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1163, 1176, 1179, 1186 (2003) (characterizing the subjection of a
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when the state subjects GBV victims to arrest, incarceration, and/or
criminalization in the name of the greater good through the use of material
witness warrants, contempt power, criminal charges, and prosecutions, it
imposes a degree of harm upon them that can be characterized as
“sacrifice.”358 Furthermore, intentionally withholding much-needed
assistance measures from GBV victims who lack resources such as basic
economic means, legal immigration status, and a support network
significantly harms them.359 As discussed above, whether or not GBV
victims acquiesce, they are significantly harmed by the use of these tactics
intended to coerce their participation in the investigation and prosecution
of the offender.360
Moreover, the practices at issue do not fit into putative exceptions to
the non-sacrifice principle. A major reason for this is the absence of
overall societal benefit resulting from their use, as demonstrated in the
above discussion of flawed utilitarian justifications advanced by their
defenders.361 Thus, there are not compelling grounds that necessitate the
sacrifice of individuals to effectively address. This is not to say that GBV
is not a pressing societal issue; but rather that “sacrificing” victims against
their will is neither a necessary nor a wise way to address it. Furthermore,
even if sacrificing victims were an effective way of combatting GBV in
society, doing so would violate Rawls’s prescription that burdens be
distributed in an equitable manner362 because GBV victims are
disproportionately from disadvantaged groups.363 Given the lack of
potentially innocent person to criminal conviction and punishment as sacrificing that person for the
general good of society).
358. See discussion of serious harms resulting from the state’s use of these practices with GBV
victims, supra section II.A.
359. See id. Moral philosophical accounts of “intentional omissions” suggest that intentionally
withholding needed assistance counts as intentional harm. For example, in a hypothetical involving a
child drowning in a pond and a bystander, after deliberating for a bit, choosing not to jump in and
save the child, the bystander harms the child by intentionally omitting to jump in the pond. The
bystander had the capacity to save the child, but decided not to do so, which resulted in the child’s
death. See Neil Feit, Harming by Failing to Benefit, 22 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 809, 817,
819–20 (2019). David Boonin provides a similar example, arguing that if Person A has a pill in his
pocket that would prevent Person B from suffering a great deal of pain, but A declines to give it to B,
then A has harmed B by withholding the medicine. DAVID BOONIN, THE NON-IDENTITY PROBLEM
AND THE ETHICS OF FUTURE PEOPLE 53 n.2 (2014).
360. See supra section II.A.
361. See supra section II.B.
362. See RAWLS, supra note 341, at 333–34.
363. ANDREA J. NICHOLS, SEX TRAFFICKING IN THE UNITED STATES: THEORY, RESEARCH,
POLICY, AND PRACTICE 90, 224, 272 (2016); Bushra Sabri, Saraniya Tharmarajah, Veronica P. S.
Njie-Carr, Jill T. Messing, Em Loerzel, Joyell Arscott & Jacquelyn C. Campbell, Safety Planning
with Marginalized Survivors of Intimate Partner Violence: Challenges of Conducting Safety Planning
Intervention Research with Marginalized Women, TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 1, 1 (2021).
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legitimate justification for the intentional and significant harms the state
imposes on GBV victims without their consent through the types of
practices detailed in Part I, we can conclude that the state improperly
“sacrifices” them, in violation of foundational liberal values.
IV. SHIFTING THE APPROACH: VICTIMS AS AGENTS
After viewing the widespread state approach of treating GBV victims
essentially as instruments to further its prosecutorial goals through
multiple philosophical lenses, we can appreciate its lack of sound moral
grounding and clearly see the need for change. But what type of approach
would align both with our normative commitments and with what
empirical research tells us about different responses to GBV? I propose
taking steps to shift the state’s approach from one that constructs GBV
victims as instruments to one that instead treats them as agents with the
right to set and pursue their own ends. This would require state actors to
avoid using coercive and instrumentalizing practices to compel GBV
victims’ participation in the criminal legal process. These practices punish
GBV victims who violate “ideal” or “genuine” victim stereotypes by
exercising agency—making the decision that they do not wish to
participate in the investigation or prosecution of the offender—and failing
to fully cooperate with law enforcement authorities.364 The practices often
employ the state’s penal structures and procedures—arrest, criminal
charges, and jails and prisons.365 Even those that do not can be
conceptualized as punitive in nature, as the denial of vital assistance to
victims solely because they do not (or do not sufficiently) assist law
enforcement arguably constitutes “hard treatment” that the state
purposefully inflicts for putative wrongdoing.366 The perceived
“wrongdoing” on the part of the victim is a failure to assist authorities
with the investigation and prosecution of the offender, which the state
views as beneficial for the victim and for society as a whole. Thus, an
important first step towards treating victims as agents rather than as
364. See supra note 26; see also van Dijk, Free the Victim, supra note 1, at 13–18 (discussing
criticism of and denial of legitimate victim status to crime victims who defy stereotypes by asserting
their autonomy and/or interfering with the investigation or prosecution of the case).
365. See supra sections I.A–.B.
366. See Mitchell N. Berman, The Justification of Punishment, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 141, 142–43 (Andrei Marmor ed., 2012) (exploring the meaning of
“punishment”); Rutledge, Gift Horse, supra note 21, at 246 (characterizing California’s denial of
CVCP eligibility to domestic violence victims who choose not to participate in the prosecution of
their abuser as “clearly punitive”); cf. Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 673 (2009) (asserting that banning individuals with a past felony drug
conviction from receiving public assistance “punishes not only parents, but also their children” and
is also a “harsh punishment for first-time petty drug offenders”).
TO
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instruments is to stop punishing them for exercising agency within their
lives.
A.

Increasing Viable Options

Not only should the state avoid punishing GBV victims’ exercises of
agency, but it should take affirmative steps to facilitate them. Doing so
would promote a Kantian and Nussbaumian vision of respect for human
dignity and personhood, especially against the backdrop of current and
historical norms which have greatly disempowered GBV victims. At its
core, facilitating individuals’ ability to exercise agency is about genuinely
increasing their viable options.367 One way to do so is to decouple victim
assistance measures from cooperation with law enforcement. This would
increase victims’ options because they would be able to decide at their
own pace whether they wish to participate in the criminal legal process
and receive resources, support, and status that can assist them in their
recovery and help them to avoid revictimization.368 They would no longer
be coerced into participation based on a desperate need for material
support or legal immigration status, and could then more freely decide
whether participating would further their own ends.369 In this way,
removing the conditions placed on eligibility for assistance measures
would loosen some of the constraints on GBV victims’ freedom of choice.
Another means of facilitating GBV victims’ agency is to increase the
availability and legitimacy of restorative justice370 mechanisms for GBV
367. See Neomi Rao, Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
183, 204–06, 216–17 (2011); Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique
of Mandatory Interventions in Domestic Violence Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 24–32, 43–48
(2009) [hereinafter Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism]; Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and
Forgiveness: Feminist Responses to Violent Injustice, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 967, 977 (1998).
368. See Deborah K. Anderson & Daniel G. Saunders, Leaving an Abusive Partner: An Empirical
Review of Predictors, the Process of Leaving, and Psychological Well-Being, 4 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE,
& ABUSE 163, 171 (2003) (finding that a lack of financial resources is a significant barrier to leaving
an abusive partner, thereby increasing the risk of further abuse); Jennifer L. Matjasko, Phyllis
Holditch Niolon & Linda Anne Valle, The Role of Economic Factors and Economic Support in
Preventing and Escaping from Intimate Partner Violence, 32 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 122, 123–
26 (2013) (explaining that economic assistance can be necessary for victims of intimate partner
violence to escape violent relationships and can alleviate the financial stress that contributes to
“situational couple violence” for victims who stay with their partners); Rebecca Surtees & Fabrice de
Kerchove, Who Funds Re/integration? Ensuring Sustainable Services for Trafficking Victims, 3 ANTITRAFFICKING REV. 64, 65 (2014) (asserting that long-term reintegration services are critical to
preventing human trafficking victims from being re-trafficked).
369. See Mills, supra note 22, at 603–04; Minow, supra note 367, at 980–81; Nanasi, supra note
86, at 286; Rutledge, Gift Horse, supra note 21, at 272.
370. Restorative justice refers to dialogue-based interventions aimed at repairing the harm the
crime has caused. It typically involves bringing together, on an informed and consensual basis, the
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crimes. Many state actors and victim advocates have traditionally opposed
GBV victim participation in these processes, leading them to discourage
victims from consenting to them.371 Some states have even prohibited the
use of restorative justice in IPV cases.372 As a result, restorative justice is
rarely utilized to address GBV in the U.S.373 But empirical studies have
demonstrated the great promise of certain restorative justice mechanisms
for addressing GBV in terms of promoting accountability, satisfying
victims,374 and/or reducing the frequency and severity of reoffending.375
As the lack of options the state offers GBV victims in response to the
violence they have endured has been a persistent issue,376 expanding the
number and type of options that are both available to them and presented
as legitimate courses of action, including restorative justice and other nonpunitive mechanisms, would facilitate their agency.
B.

Statutory Reform
Statutory reform is one avenue for implementing protections against

victim, the party responsible for causing the harm, and other family and/or community stakeholders
to identify a tailored plan for healing and repair with the help of a trained facilitator. See Coker, supra
note 7, at 187–92; SERED, supra note 6, at 133–41.
371. See Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism, supra note 367, at 30.
372. GOODMARK, supra note 129, at 92.
373. See id. at 97 (noting that “[a]lthough the United States has largely rejected the use of
restorative justice in situations involving intimate partner violence,” many other countries use them
regularly); Mimi E. Kim, Transformative Justice and Restorative Justice: Gender-Based Violence
and Alternative Visions of Justice in the United States, 27 INT’L REV. VICTIMOLOGY 162, 169 (2021);
Bazelon & Green, supra note 134, at 298.
374. See, e.g., Robert C. Davis, The Brooklyn Mediation Field Test, 5 J. EXPERIMENTAL
CRIMINOLOGY 25, 28, 33 (2009) (finding that 73% of victims whose case had been mediated reported
satisfaction with the outcome and that 88% believed that their case had been conducted fairly, which
is statistically significantly more than the 54% and 76% of victims whose cases had been prosecuted
who had reported satisfaction and fairness, respectively, in a randomized controlled trial of adults
arrested on felony charges for a crime against someone they knew (43% of which involved IPV));
Mary P. Koss, The RESTORE Program of Restorative Justice for Sex Crimes: Vision, Process, and
Outcomes, 29 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1623, 1646–48, 1654 (2014) (finding that most
participants in RESTORE, a restorative justice program adapted to adult misdemeanor and felony
sexual assault cases, reported that they were satisfied with the program (especially survivor-victims
and their supporters) and believed that justice had been done).
375. See, e.g., Linda G. Mills, Briana Barocas, Robert P. Butters & Barak Ariel, A Randomized
Controlled Trial of Restorative Justice-Informed Treatment for Domestic Violence Crimes, 3 NATURE
HUM. BEHAV. 1284, 1289 (2019) (finding that domestic violence offenders randomly assigned to a
restorative justice-informed treatment had statistically significantly fewer new arrests and lower crime
severity scores during a 24-month period than domestic violence offenders randomly assigned to a
standard batterer intervention program).
376. See Bazelon & Green, supra note 134, at 327 (“Under our current system, victims who report
their sexual assaults to the police are presented at most with two options: the potential for a criminal
conviction, which may or may not be realized, or nothing at all.”); Linda G. Mills, The Justice of
Recovery: How the State Can Heal the Violence of Crime, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 457, 458, 487 (2006).
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the punishment of GBV victim agency and affirmative mechanisms for
facilitating it. For example, at the federal level, the recent VOCA
amendment allowing state CVCPs to make exceptions to the requirement
that victims cooperate with law enforcement requests as a prerequisite for
compensation is a step in the right direction.377 However, victims’ agency
is still constrained by the lack of a statutory mandate that CVCPs actually
apply the exception in practice and by the exception’s vagueness and
narrowness.378 An approach committed to respecting victims as agentic
individuals requires further amendment to VOCA to fully decouple
compensation eligibility from cooperation with law enforcement.
Similarly, the Immigration and Nationality Act379 should be amended to
provide T and U visa eligibility on humanitarian grounds to human
trafficking and other GBV victims, respectively, who do not wish to
participate in the criminal legal process, regardless of their reasons.
Some state legislatures have made statutory moves in the direction of
an approach that values GBV victims’ agency and dignity. Following
public outcry about a rape victim with mental illness who was jailed for
nearly a month on a material witness warrant, Texas enacted Jenny’s
Law,380 which entitles victims and other witnesses to counsel and a
hearing before they can be detained as a material witness.381 California
has prohibited the imprisonment of sexual assault and domestic violence
victims for contempt based on a refusal to testify about their
victimization.382 However, the law fails to include victims of other types
of GBV crimes in this exemption, such as sex trafficking, female genital
mutilation, and honor-based violence.383 Moreover, California’s material
witness statute contains no such exemptions, so GBV victims can still be
arrested and jailed on material witness warrants.384
A number of states have also been reconsidering their statutory
restrictions on restorative justice in GBV cases. For example, Vermont
explicitly prohibited referral of “case[s] involving domestic violence,
sexual violence, sexual assault, or stalking” to its community justice
centers (restorative justice providers) in 2007,385 but a decade later created
377. See supra text accompanying notes 76–85.
378. See supra notes 83–85.
379. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952).
380. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 24.111 (West 2017).
381. Id.; see also Gunter, supra note 145.
382. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1219(b) (West 2019).
383. Id.
384. CAL. PENAL CODE § 881 (West 2021).
385. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 1967 (2007). The statute provided a limited exception for
“Department of Corrections offender reentry programs pursuant to protocols protecting victims.” Id.
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a committee to study whether restorative justice processes should be
permitted in these types of cases.386 In its final report, the committee
concluded that “restorative justice ought to be pursued as a means to
address domestic violence, sexual violence and stalking” through
formalized, evidence-based programs housed within a public body or
agency.387 Yet, as of this writing the prohibition remains on the books.
Colorado’s Restorative Justice Coordinating Council388 has also recently
been exploring the potential use of restorative justice in domestic violence
cases,389 which would require the state to repeal its laws excluding those
convicted of domestic violence from eligibility for restorative justice
practices.390 The state’s Domestic Violence Offender Management Board
(DVOMB), however, issued a white paper in opposition, citing a risk of
harm to victims and the community, Colorado’s lack of regulations for
restorative justice practitioners, concerns about inconsistencies in
offender services and exacerbating criminal tendencies in “psychopathic”
offenders, and insufficient research on the use of restorative justice for
domestic violence cases.391 Regarding this final justification, the white
paper misleadingly states that “[t]he DVOMB searched for research on
this topic and found that none had been published,”392 despite the
existence of published, peer-reviewed studies on the subject.393 One hopes
386. 2018 Vt. Acts & Resolves 146.
387. VT. NETWORK AGAINST DOMESTIC & SEXUAL VIOLENCE, FINAL REPORT TO THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY OF THE RESTORATIVE JUSTICE STUDY COMMITTEE, at 3, 11–12 (July 1, 2019),
http://legislature.vermont.gov/Documents/2020/WorkGroups/Justice%20Oversight/Incarceration%2
0Issues/W~Sarah%20Robinson~Final%20Report%20of%20the%20Restorative%20Justice%20Stud
y%20Committee~9-6-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/UL8E-ALDM].
388. The Colorado legislature created this body in 2007 within the Office of the State Court
Administrator to support the development of restorative justice programs, conduct trainings, and build
restorative justice resources. 2007 Colo. Sess. Laws 277–78 (codified as amended at COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-3-116 (West 2022)).
389. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OFFENDER MGMT. BD., PUBLIC SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS WITH RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES, at 1 (Dec. 15, 2020),
http://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/dcj/DCJ%20External%20Website/DVOMB/Public%20Safety%20Consid
erations%20and%20Policy%20Implications%20with%20Restorative%20Justice%20in%20Domesti
c%20Violence%20Cases%20Final%2012.15.2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ARD-HKRT].
390. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-1.3-104(1)(b.5)(l), 18-1.3-204(2)(a)(III.5) (West 2022).
These provisions also exclude individuals convicted of unlawful sexual behavior, stalking, or a
protection order violation from restorative justice eligibility.
391. See DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OFFENDER MGMT. BD., supra note 389, at 5–6, 8–9, 11–12.
392. Id. at 1.
393. See, e.g., Mills et al., supra note 375 (randomized controlled trial of a restorative justiceinformed intervention for domestic violence perpetrators published in a peer-reviewed journal with a
very high impact factor); Davis, supra note 374 (randomized controlled trial of restorative mediation
intervention for felony arrest cases (43% of which involved IPV) published in a peer-reviewed
journal). Barocas et al. identify three randomized controlled trials and twelve qualitative studies
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that the Restorative Justice Coordinating Council will correct this
misconception and continue to work towards establishing restorative
justice as a legitimate option in GBV cases.
While many of these statutory reforms (and proposed reforms) are
positive beginning steps, much more needs to be done to bolster victims’
rights in the face of the state’s power and tendency to coerce and
instrumentalize them.394 Statutory change can be an effective tool to
empower GBV victims, but it cannot be our only tool if we wish to realize
an approach that genuinely respects their agency and dignity.
C.

Cultural Change

Beyond statutory reform, shifting the state’s approach to GBV victims
requires cultural change within our criminal legal institutions, especially
prosecutors’ offices and police departments. Legislative reform is useful
for addressing particular instrumentalizing practices, but often fails to
address the values, biases, and social scripts that undergird the
conceptualization of GBV victims as mere instruments to be used in
furtherance of the state’s prosecutorial goals. But how can we reform
deep-seated cultures within these institutions, which are notoriously
resistant to change?395
Third Circuit Judge and former law professor Stephanos Bibas
proposes a two-part strategy to improve prosecutorial behavior more
generally: (1) stakeholders should exert external pressure upon
prosecutors, particularly head prosecutors, and (2) head prosecutors
should structure and manage their offices in a way that fosters ethical
behavior among their subordinates.396 On this latter point, Bibas
underscores the power of institutional design and management to
influence prosecutorial conduct more effectively than external regulation:

examining the use of restorative justice in the domestic violence context, most of which are published
in peer-reviewed journals. Barocas et al., supra note 207, at 327. These fifteen empirical studies were
published between 2005 and 2019. Id. The DVOMB white paper was released in December 2020 but
fails to cite any of them. See DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OFFENDER MGMT. BD., supra note 389.
394. For example, it is deeply problematic that “courts frequently issue material witness warrants
without any discussion of the negative impact arrest and detention will likely have on human
trafficking victims.” WU & YELDERMAN, supra note 30, at 2 (emphasis in original).
395. See Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U.
PA. L. REV. 959, 998 (2009); Ryan Cohen, The Force and the Resistance: Why Changing the Police
Force Is Neither Inevitable, Nor Impossible, 20 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 105, 112–13 (2017);
Rebecca Richardson & Besiki Luka Kutateladze, Tempering Expectations: A Qualitative Study of
Prosecutorial Reform, 58 J. RSCH. CRIME & DELINQUENCY 41, 45, 51, 54, 57, 59, 62, 64–65 (2021);
Seth W. Stoughton, Principled Policing: Warrior Cops and Guardian Officers, 51 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 611, 662–66 (2016).
396. See Bibas, supra note 395, at 963–64.
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“[s]imply commanding ethical, consistent behavior is far less effective
than creating an environment that hires for, inculcates, expects, and
rewards ethics and consistency.”397 Although Bibas’s analysis focuses on
changing the culture and operation of prosecutors’ offices, his strategy
should also work with police departments, as he largely bases his
proposals on management literature concerning organizational culture,
structure, and dynamics.398 A large-scale study surveying more than
13,000 officers across eighty-nine U.S. police and sheriff departments
found that officers’ views on topics including the need for “toughness,”
the duty to report observed officer misconduct, the fairness of promotion
procedures, and whether top management acknowledges high- and lowquality work performance varied greatly across different departments.399
Notably, the study revealed that officers’ outlook was much more strongly
associated with police department affiliation than with their personal
characteristics (gender, race, age, rank, and education level).400 Thus, a
particular police culture is not inevitable and organizational changes have
the potential to create cultural change.
According to Bibas, an essential part of fostering a more ethical and
consistent office culture is having prosecutorial leadership that frequently
models and communicates values that are important to key stakeholders,
including crime victims and the public.401 Both of these stakeholder
groups value GBV victim agency and dignity, and head prosecutors
should communicate the importance of these values to line prosecutors.
“District attorneys who repeatedly mention . . . victims’ concerns and
discourage bragging about win-loss records can communicate these
priorities to their subordinates.”402 Likewise, state prosecutorial
leadership like Ohio Attorney General David Yost should discourage,
rather than encourage, arresting GBV victims and other coercive
practices.403 Police chiefs and sheriffs can similarly foster a more ethical
approach towards GBV victims through frequent words and deeds that
demonstrate respect for victims’ concerns and agency, and discouraging
coercive tactics aimed at securing their cooperation.
In addition to direct messaging and behavior modeling, prosecutor and
police leaders can promote cultural change through their internal office
397. Id. at 963.
398. See id. at 963, 996.
399. Gary Cordner, Police Culture: Individual and Organizational Differences in Police Officer
Perspectives, 40 POLICING: INT’L J. 11, 13–21 (2017).
400. Id. at 21.
401. Bibas, supra note 395, at 997–1000.
402. Id. at 1000.
403. See Moore, supra note 114.
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policies, concrete objective-setting, personnel decisions, performance
monitoring, training, and rewards for ethical conduct.404 For example,
incentive systems that reward prosecutors solely or primarily for winning
convictions encourage them to treat victims as a means of doing so.
Changing these incentives to reward prosecutors who respect victims’
dignity and agency would facilitate a change in behavior and institutional
culture. Likewise, police should develop incentive structures that
disincentivize instrumentalizing and coercive tactics such as threatening
victims with charges to secure their cooperation, and reward agencypromoting practices like offering to refer victims to assistance services
regardless of their interest in participating in the criminal legal process.405
This would require police leadership to pay more attention to officers’
performance than they currently do, as the aforementioned large-scale
survey of officer perspectives found that most departments fail to reward
officers who consistently perform well and fail to penalize those who
consistently perform poorly.406
Raising awareness about the pitfalls of “ideal” and “genuine” victim
stereotypes through training initiatives can also help to shift perspectives
on “appropriate” GBV victim behavior and wishes. High-quality training
for police, prosecutors, and judges can similarly mitigate certain
assumptions about GBV survivors’ credibility and/or the seriousness of
their victimization, which are typically based upon survivors’ demeanor
and ability to communicate consistent, coherent, and detailed narratives
of their abuse.407 However, Epstein and Goodman point out that training
alone is often insufficient to combat cultural assumptions about GBV
victims rooted in implicit bias, and argue that these “may require a more
complex set of interventions” to address.408 These interventions should be
aimed at cultivating self-awareness and the motivation to overcome
implicit biases among legal system actors.409 For police and prosecutors,
the organizational design and management reforms discussed above could
404. See Bibas, supra note 395, at 1003–15; L. Song Richardson, Police Racial Violence: Lessons
from Social Psychology, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2961, 2973, 2975–76 (2015); Richardson &
Kutateladze, supra note 395, at 64.
405. Cf. Richardson, supra note 404, at 2973 (“Rewarding the problem-solving and social work
aspects of policing will naturally lead to changes in the hypermasculine police culture because those
individuals not interested in engaging in this type of policing will no longer be attracted to the field.
Furthermore, as these problem-solving and relational skills become more important, departments will
have to begin recruiting individuals who excel in these areas, again helping to slowly change the
culture.”).
406. Cordner, supra note 399, at 17–18.
407. See Epstein & Goodman, supra note 136, at 453.
408. Id. at 454.
409. See id. at 454 & n.245.
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effectively complement training initiatives to engender cultural change.
For judges, much depends upon whether they are elected or appointed
because elected judges, like elected prosecutors, tend to be sensitive to
external stakeholder pressure.410
As a foundational matter, greater transparency is needed to permit
effective monitoring of system actors’ conduct towards victims, which in
turn would better allow stakeholders to respond to objectionable
approaches. For instance, if there existed readily accessible information
about the number of GBV victims incarcerated through material witness
warrants across different jurisdictions, the public and other stakeholders
could more precisely and persuasively exert pressure upon judges and
prosecutors to cease this practice and change the underlying culture that
sanctions it. Though it will take time,411 the investment in efforts to change
cultures that permit, or even condone, highly coercive and
instrumentalizing practices will yield considerable benefits for victims in
the future.
D.

Revisiting Moral Philosophy

An approach centered on GBV victims’ ability to exercise agency
within their lives would align well with the moral demands of Kantian
ethics and avoid improperly dehumanizing and sacrificing them. But what
of utilitarian ethics? Although deontology and consequentialist moral
theories, like utilitarianism, are typically viewed in opposition to one
another,412 we saw that the state’s coercive and instrumentalizing
approach towards GBV victims fails under both deontology and
utilitarianism.413 Facilitating victims’ agency would not offend utilitarian
ethics as a response to GBV as long as it was paired with other measures
that will reduce overall GBV rates within society—which I argue require
an investment in mitigating the structural drivers of this social problem.
As defining features of a restructured approach to GBV that avoids a
myopic focus on traditional criminal legal responses, constructing victims

410. See Carlos Berdejó & Noam Yuchtman, Crime, Punishment, and Politics: An Analysis of
Political Cycles in Criminal Sentencing, 95 REV. ECON. & STAT. 741, 742, 754–55 (2013) (finding
empirically that elected Washington state judges hand down more severe sentences for serious
offenses as elections approach due to political pressure); Bibas, supra note 395, at 996 (“Pressure
from voters, victims, and defendants can influence prosecutors, particularly head prosecutors who
care about reelection.”).
411. See Bibas, supra note 395, at 998; Richardson & Kutateladze, supra note 395, at 62;
Stoughton, supra note 395, 674–75.
412. See Larry Alexander & Michael Moore, Deontological Ethics, STAN. ENCYC. PHIL. (Oct. 30,
2020), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological/ [https://perma.cc/BR4S-SFF8].
413. See supra sections II.B, III.A.
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as agents and investing in communities offers the opportunity to honor
our normative commitments and heed the existing evidence base.
Lastly, we must ask: is state paternalism towards GBV victims ever
appropriate? As I argue above, there should be a very strong presumption
that adult victims are better placed to know their own best interests than
the state is.414 However, in certain cases, a victim may have a
psychological or cognitive impairment that seriously interferes with her
ability to make decisions on her own behalf. As Linda Mills emphasizes,
this type of impairment should not be presumed and should instead be
diagnosed by a trained clinician.415 Ideally, given the significant threat to
a victim’s autonomy in this situation, independent evaluations from
multiple clinicians should be required. In cases where a serious
impairment exists, paternalism may be appropriate. This also may be the
case in limited situations where GBV is extremely severe, ongoing, and
family- and community-based interventions have failed. But paternalistic
state action must actually align with the goals of paternalism—to benefit
and protect from harm—which is very often not the case when the state
employs traditional criminal legal responses. The state must be
thoughtful, considered, and restrained when engaging in paternalism with
GBV victims. It should aim to do so in the least agency-restrictive way
possible. It should also respect victims’ individuality and ensure that its
paternalistic actions are tailored to their individual needs and
circumstances.416 In some cases, this may take the form of having a
specialized GBV counselor or social worker approach a victim to discuss
safety planning even though she has not requested this assistance. As a
last resort in very severe cases, paternalism may take the form of pursuing
an evidence-based prosecution of the offender against the victim’s
wishes.417 But paternalism should never translate to criminalizing and/or
incarcerating a GBV victim for her unwillingness to testify or otherwise
participate in the criminal legal process.
CONCLUSION
Drawing on moral philosophy and liberal legal theory to analyze our
laws, practices, and institutions enables us to critically reflect upon the
values they embody and whether these values are consistent with our
foundational normative commitments as a liberal society. In applying this
414. See supra section II.A.
415. Mills, supra note 22, at 608.
416. See Nussbaum, supra note 315, at 265.
417. An evidence-based prosecution relies on types of evidence other than victim testimony, but
this has become more difficult since the Crawford decision.
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lens to the state’s overarching approach to GBV victims, this Article
exposes fundamental inconsistencies among this approach and various
philosophical frameworks—both those used to justify the state’s approach
and those reflecting our commitment to respecting human dignity and
autonomy.
At this current inflection point, we have the opportunity to widen the
conversation around criminal justice reform to include practices that
instrumentalize, dehumanize, and deny dignity to victims. Much of this
conversation is rightly focused on the treatment of defendants, but
victims—who this Article demonstrates also frequently become ensnared
in the state’s carceral machinery—must not be overlooked. Moreover, the
practices at issue, intended to coerce victims’ participation in criminal
investigations and prosecutions, are not only harmful to victims, but also
cause significant harm to offenders and communities. We must harness
the current momentum for criminal justice reflection and reform to
develop an approach that consistently values human dignity and avoids
treating any individuals as mere “sacrificial objects.”

